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INTRODUCTION
The problems inherent in interstate child and spousal sup-
port enforcement' have been lamented for at least a half cen-
tury.2 The federal and state governments have taken numerous
steps to enhance interstate establishment and collection of sup-
port.' Two of the latest steps in this process were the 1992
See U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR
CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 3 (1992) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR
REFO ] (citing coordination between individuals and agencies in two or more ju-
risdictions; differing forms, policies, and procedures; and lengthier processing time
as some of challenges in handling interstate cases); id. at 4 ("It is well known that
the easiest way to avoid paying child support is to leave the state in which you were
ordered to pay support.") (quoting Wendy Epstein, Executive Director, Illinois Task
Force on Child Support); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAW 88 (1987) ("The obstacles encountered by support creditors when the support
debtor defaults, especially if [the debtor] is located in another state, have often
proven practically insurmountable."); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 286-87 (1985) (emphasizing costs associated
with initiation of new legal proceedings to enforce support decrees); Janelle T. Cal-
houn, Comment, Interstate Child Support Enforcement System: Juggernaut of Bu-
reaucracy, 46 MERCER L. REV. 921, 924 (1995) (noting that "conflicting state regula-
tions, confusing federal requirements, and overwhelming caseloads" have frustrated
interstate enforcement efforts).
2 See UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT ("URESA") prefatory
note, 9B U.L.A. 556 (1987) (discussing Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act,
adopted in 1910, as early effort to remedy problem of non-support); Marygold S.
Melli, The United States: Child Support Enforcement For the 21st Century, 32 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 475, 475 (1994) ("United States public policy has struggled
with the interstate nature of the child support problem since the early 1900s.").
3 For decades, the federal government has imposed on the states, usually as
part of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-669 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1996), increasingly specific requirements relating to child support enforce-
ment as a condition of receiving federal finds for social welfare programs. See, e.g.,
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 12-14 (detailing difficulties faced by obli-
gees seeking enforcement of support orders which led Congress to enact Child Sup-
port Enforcement Amendments to Title IV-D in 1984 and Family Support Act of
1988); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, reprinted in STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN & HERMA HILL KAY,
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166, 169-174 (1990) (discussing development
of increasingly stringent child support enforcement legislation); Charlotte L. Allen,
Federalization of Child Support: Twenty Years and Counting, 73 MICH. B.J. 660,
660-61 (1994) (analyzing impact of federal legislation on state procedure); Calhoun,
supra note 1, at 929 ("The states were coerced into compliance by the threat of
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promulgation of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
("UIFSA")4 and the 1994 adoption of the federal Full Faith and
Credit For Child Support Orders Act ("FFCCSOA").5 The 1996
federal "welfare reform" bill' affected both of these statutes by
requiring the states to pass UIFSA by January 1, 1998, 7 and by
amending FFCCSOA to achieve greater consistency with
UIFSA.8
Each of these statutes is premised upon the laudably
straightforward "one-order-at-a-time" system:9 only one state's
order should govern, at any given time, an obligor's support obli-
gation to any particular obligee or child; only one state should
have continuing jurisdiction to modify that order; and all other
states should give that one order full faith and credit ° and re-
AFDC ftmding loss.").
4 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (amended 1996) [copy on file with
author]. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") adopted several "non-controversial" amendments at its annual confer-
ence in July, 1996. Proceedings in the Committee of the Whole, Amendments to Uni-
form Interstate Family Support Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 7, July 12-19, 1996 [hereinafter, "NCCUSL Proceedings"]. At
this writing, no state has adopted any of these recent amendments. But Congress
has required the states to adopt any amendments approved by NCCUSL before
January 1, 1998. See infra note 7. Therefore, citations to UIFSA in this article will
be to the newly amended act, which was issued by NCCUSL on November 19, 1996.
'28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
'Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
7 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333). The sec-
tion provides:
In order to satisfy section 454(20)(A) [42 U.S.C. § 654(20)(A) (1994)], on
and after January 1, 1998, each State must have in effect the Uniform In-
terstate Family Support Act, as approved by the American Bar Association
on February 9, 1993, together with any amendments officially adopted be-
fore January 1, 1998 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws.
Id. Section 454 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West Supp. 1996),
enumerates the requirements that a state's "plan for child and spousal support"
must include in order to be eligible for federal payments under section 455. 42
U.S.C.A. § 655 (West Supp. 1995).
8 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B (West Supp. 1996); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725 (1996).
9 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT prefatory note; Interstate Modifi-
cations of Court-Ordered Child Support: Hearings on H.R. 5304 Before the Sub-
comm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 102d Cong. 9-10, 28 (1992) [hereinafter Interstate Modifications Hearings];
S. REP. No. 103-361, at 4-5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259, 3260-61;
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 87 ("The Commission strongly believes
that only one tribunal should control the terms of the support order.").
"o The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, is generally held
to apply only to judgments that are nonmodifiable and final-two characteristics
[Vol. 71:1
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frain from modifying it unless the first state no longer has juris-
diction.
These are major changes from the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act ("URESA")," UIFSA's immediate uni-
form-law predecessor.12 Under URESA, a state often felt free to
modify another state's support order while maintaining that the
original order remained in effect.13 Frequently, two or more valid
often absent from the typical ongoing child or spousal support order. See, e.g., Sis-
tare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1909) (holding that no full faith and credit enti-
tlement exists in judgment for alimony allocation since annulment or modification of
amount is continually subject to discretion of issuing court); cf Barber v. Barber,
323 U.S. 77, 86 (1944) (affording protection of Full Faith and Credit Clause to judg-
ment for arrears of alimony since it was not subject to judicial modification). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 73 (1982); LEA BRILMAYER, AN
INTRODUCTION To JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 360-61 (1986);
William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412,
419-21 (1994) (positing that judgment which is not final under law of forum state is
not entitled to full faith and credit). Since 1986, Congress has required states to rec-
ognize past-due child support installments as final judgments entitled to full faith
and credit. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(A) (1994). Since its inception, the amendment,
commonly referred to as the "Bradley Amendment," has been highly successful in
enhancing interstate enforcement of delinquent support payments. BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM, supra note 1, at 90.
" 9B U.L.A. 567 (1987). In 1968, URESA was revised and retitled the Revised
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("RURESA"). 9B U.L.A. 381 (1987).
While the majority of states eventually enacted RURESA, the original URESA re-
mained on the books in many states. In order to remedy perceived enforcement dif-
ficulties, some states enacted a slightly different statute, the Uniform Support of
Dependents Law ("USDL"). See John J. Sampson & Paul M. Kurtz, UIFSA: An In-
terstate Support Act for the 21st Century, 27 FAM. L.Q. 85, 86 (1993). Unless other-
wise indicated, this Article uses the term "URESA" to include URESA, RURESA,
and USDL.
'2 UIFSA builds upon URESA's establishment of the "two-state" enforcement
proceeding, through which an obligee in one state does not have to travel to the ob-
ligor's state or hire a private attorney for enforcement. See John J. Sampson, Uni-
form Interstate Family Support Act (With Unofficial Annotations), 27 FAM. L.Q. 93,
151 n.127 (1993) (noting that mechanics of registering foreign support order under
UIFSA "are only slightly changed from those found in RURESA § 39"). Instead, the
obligee may initiate a proceeding in her own state to forward the order to the obli-
gor's state for registration and enforcement. Id. at 150-51. For thorough descriptions
of the URESA two-state procedure, see HOMER H. CLARI, JR., THE LAW OF Do-
MESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 276-81 (1988); Tina M. Fielding, Note,
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act: The New URESA, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 425, 436-40 (1994).
'3 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 31, 9B
U.L.A. 531 (1987) ("A support order made by a court of this State pursuant to this
Act does not nullify and is not nullified by ... a support order made by a court of any
other state pursuant to a substantially similar act .... "); id. § 40(a), 9B U.L.A. 546
(1987) ("Upon registration the registered foreign support order shall be treated in
the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this State."); UNIF.
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 30, 9B U.L.A. 600 (1987) ("No order
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court orders from different states established entirely different
support obligations for the same obligor and child, engendering
uncertainty and complicating the calculation of arrearages."4
Moreover, URESA encouraged forum-shopping by allowing rela-
tively easy modification in a state inconvenient to an ex-spouse.'5
The rationale for promulgating both a uniform law, URESA,
and a federal statute, FFCCSOA, that accomplish essentially the
same objective is somewhat elusive. Many states began enacting
UIFSA after the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws approved UIFSA in 1992.16 Some child support
advocates, however, worried that piecemeal, state-by-state
adoption of UIFSA would delay receipt of the intended benefits
by interstate obligees.' In addition, given the states' patchwork
adoption of variants of URESA-the Revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act ("RURESA"), the Uniform Support
of Dependents Law ("USDL"), and similar statutes-UIFSA sup-
porters believed that the "uniform law" would become anything
but uniform.18
of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a responding state shall su-
persede any other order of support .... "); id. § 38, 9B U.L.A. 606 (1987) ("The support
order ... shall have the same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered in
the court of this state."); BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 230 ("[Mlost
practitioners believe that once a registered order is modified, the underlying order
is modified as well."); see also infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (discussing
modification of child support orders).
14 See, e.g., Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Troxel, 931 S.W.2d 784 (Ark.
1996); Shepherd v. Shepherd, 429 N.W.2d 145 (Iowa 1988); Taylor v. Vilcheck, 745
P.2d 702 (Nev. 1987); Hubanks v. Hubanks, 555 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996);
Kranz v. Kranz, 525 N.W.2d 777 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); see also CLARK, supra note
12, at 282-84; Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision of
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act That No Support Order Shall Su-
persede or Nullify Any Other Order, 31 A.L.R. 4th 347, 352-53, 356-60 (1984).
15 See Interstate Modification Hearings, supra note 9, at 9-10 (statement of Jean
Rose). For a description of some of URESA's other drawbacks, see BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM, supra note 1, at 229-31 (listing lengthy processing time, lack of cooperation
between states, incompatibility with intervening federal requirements, and lack of
uniformity).
16 Fielding, supra note 12, at 425.
'7 Interstate Modifications Hearings, supra note 9, at 16, 20, 28-29, 38-39
(remarks of Representative Frank) ("I want to do what I can to put this in place
while we go to whatever new system we go to.").
" See S. REP. NO. 103-361, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259,
3262 ("[Tlhe laws by which courts determine their authority to establish and modify
child support orders are not uniform."); BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at
231 (noting that lack of uniformity among URESA provisions adopted by individual
states engendered uncertainty among obligees seeking to enforce URESA petition in
another state); Paula Roberts, The Case For Fundamental Child Support Reform, 13
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Congress ultimately adopted two solutions to the threat of
non-uniform state law. First, FFCCSOA required states to ac-
cord full faith and credit to another state's child support order
under most circumstances."9 Second, Congress recently required
every state to pass UIFSA without alteration."0
Although the "one-order-at-a-time" principle of UIFSA and
FFCCSOA is conceptually simple, the language of the statutes,
particularly that of UIFSA,2' is a bit more problematic. Like the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA")22 and the
state Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA7) 3 before
them, the federal FFCCSOA and the state UIFSA do not work
entirely in tandem.24 In an ironic and seemingly unintended
FAIR$HARE 8, 10 (1993) (asserting that failure to adopt uniform versions of UIFSA
would result in replication of current URESA problems).
19 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
Oddly, the legislative reports accompanying the bills that became FFCCSOA, passed
in 1994, do not mention UIFSA, a statute adopted in 1992. See S. REP. No. 103-361
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259.
21 See supra note 7. The constitutionality of a federal requirement that states
enact a specific family law statute is beyond the scope of this Article. See New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("We have always understood that even
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require
or prohibit those acts.") It appears, however, that Congress may attempt to compel
states to enact legislation by conditioning the receipt of federal funding dispensed
under the Spending Clause. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
21 Although UIFSA's drafters endeavored to make the act "user-friendly,"
Sampson, supra note 12, at 126-27 nn.78-79, it is debatable whether the drafters
wholly achieved their desired result.
22 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994). Congress explicitly analogized FFCCSOA to the
PKPA. S. REP. No. 103-361, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259, 3261
("This bill is similar to legislation passed by Congress in 1980 to address the prob-
lems caused by the lack of uniform enforcement of child custody orders.").
9 U.L.A. pt. I, 115 (1988).
24 RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 274-75 (3d
ed. 1986); Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical Reex-
amination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 845, 938-39 (1992) (characterizing appli-
cation of UCCJA and PKPA as "disaster" and "spectacularly unsuccessful").
For example, the PKPA prohibits State 1 from modifying a child custody de-
termination by State 2 unless State 1 "has jurisdiction [under State l's UCCJA] to
make such a child custody determination" and State 2 "no longer has jurisdiction
[under State 2's UCCJA], or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify
such determination." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1994). The PKPA further provides that
State 2's jurisdiction continues so long as State 2 continues to have jurisdiction un-
der its UCCJA and "remains the residence of the child or of any contestant." 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1994). Some courts have held that a state loses custody modifi-
cation jurisdiction under the UCCJA if the child has left the state for a period of
time. E.g., Breaux v. Mays, 746 P.2d 708, 710 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (reasoning that
ST. JOHPS LAW REVIEW
twist, FFCCSOA may arguably preempt parts of UIFSA-parts
which Congress required the states to pass.5
But ironies and woebegone comparisons to the
UCCJA/PKPA conundrum do not assist those on the front lines
who must work with the new statutes. UIFSA currently has
been adopted in thirty-five states along with the District of Co-
lumbia26 and bills to enact it are pending in an additional ten
states.27 In order to assist family law practitioners, judges, stu-
dents, and other interested readers28 in understanding the over-
because children had moved to Texas two years earlier from Oklahoma, the marital
state, Oklahoma lacked custody modification jurisdiction even though father re-
mained in Oklahoma and children visited him in Oklahoma); Rosics v. Heath, 746
P.2d 1284, 1287 (Wyo. 1987) (stating that because children had moved to Wyoming
from Texas, the marital state, more than six months earlier, Texas lacked custody
modification jurisdiction even though father remained in Texas). Other courts have
held that a state continues to have custody modification jurisdiction under the
UCCJA so long as one contestant remains in the state. E.g., O'Daniel v. Walker, 686
S.W.2d 805, 807 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that Arkansas retained custody modifi-
cation jurisdiction because father continued to live there, although mother and chil-
dren had moved to Tennessee two years earlier); Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d
1003, 1009-10 (Cal. 1982) (noting that New York retained custody modification ju-
risdiction because father continued to live there and exercise visitation rights there
although mother and child had moved to California). A State 2 court might decide
that State 1 "no longer has jurisdiction" if the child has moved out of State 1, and
thus take jurisdiction of a modification petition, while the State 1 court might con-
clude the opposite, taking jurisdiction of a competing modification petition.
See infra notes 263, 274-77 and accompanying text.
2'6 The states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
and the District of Columbia. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT prefatory
note (listing jurisdictions that have adopted UIFSA).
2' Bills to enact UIFSA are pending in Alabama, 1997 H.B. 358, 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Ala. 1997), California, 1997 S.B. 568, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), Connecticut,
H.B. 5822, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1996), Hawaii, H.B. 2861, 18th Legis. (Haw.
1996), Mississippi, H.B. 777, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1997), New Hampshire, H.B.
609, 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1997), New Jersey, S.B. 153, 207th Legis. (N.J. 1996),
New York, S.B. 3539, 219th Gen. Ass. (N.Y. 1995), Vermont, H.B. 125, 64th Biennial
Sess. (Vt. 1997), and West Virginia, S.B. 292, 1996 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1996). Before
the recent federal requirement that states adopt UIFSA, see supra note 7, bills to
enact UIFSA failed in Mississippi and New Hampshire. S. 2300, 1996 Leg. Sess.
(Miss. 1996); S. 166, 1996 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1996).
8 Perhaps those most affected by the new laws are state IV-D agency workers.
These officials are named after Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, which required
states to designate a "single and separate organizational unit" centrally responsible
for child support enforcement activities for both welfare recipients and others. 42
U.S.C. § 654(3) (1994). Title IV-D also required the Federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement to provide "technical assistance" to state IV-D agencies. 42 U.S.C.
[Vol. 71:1
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lapping operation of these new statutes, Part I of this Article
presents several hypothetical fact patterns that illustrate recur-
ring problems in interstate support cases and applies UIFSA and
FFCCSOA to each pattern.29 This Part identifies several scenar-
ios where the application of these statutes generates conflicting
or inequitable results and suggests possible solutions based upon
principles of statutory interpretation, existing case law, and
public policy considerations. Part II of this Article, based upon
these applications of the statutes, proposes clarifying amend-
ments to each.0
I. CRITICAL APPLICATIONS OF UIFSA AND FFCCSOA
The following hypothetical fact patterns assume that, unless
otherwise specified, all states have adopted UIFSA without
modification. In addition, unless otherwise stated, child custody
is assumed to be undisputed and the hypothetical does not men-
tion any request for custody that would be filed as a matter of
course. Cases 1-3 involve the initial establishment of a support
order.31 Cases 4-6 address enforcement and modification of es-
tablished support orders. This Article utilizes the following ab-
breviations:
§ 652(a)(7) (1994); see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVs., ADMINISTRATION
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, UNIFORM
INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HANDBOOK [hereinafter, "OCSE
HANDBOOK"].
29 Commentators have argued that UIFSA does not go far enough to aid chil-
dren entitled to support. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitu-
tional Doctrine: Fitting International Shoe to Family Law, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1047, 1055-56 & n.36 (1995); Roberts, supra note 18, at 10 (characterizing as
"questionable" assumption that "enactment of UIFSA will radically improve inter-
state support enforcement"). Conversely, at least one member of the USCICS as-
serts that UIFSA's broad jurisdictional provisions may violate due process. Don
Chavez, Minority Report of the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support 21-22
[hereinafter Chavez], reprinted in BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 347-48.
See infra Part II and Appendix.
"UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101(21) and subsection (b) of
FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C.A § 1738B(b) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333),
define the term "support order" broadly. For example, an order directing NCP to pay
C's health care expenses would be a "support order," see Sampson, supra note 12, at
106 n.22, although the parameters of the term "health care" would be defined by
state law. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101 cmt. But see Common-
wealth of Va. ex rel. Kenitzer v. Richter, 475 S.E.2d 817, 819-20 (Va. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that order that merely stayed obligee's petition to begin automatic wage
withholding due to factual dispute concerning the existence of arrearages was not
"support order" or "income-withholding order" that could be registered in another
state under UIFSA).
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CP = Custodial Parent
NCP = NonCustodial Parent
C = Child(ren)
F = Father
M = Mother
H = Husband
W = Wife
A. Cases 1-3: Initial Establishment of a Support Order
It is important to note, in connection with these hypothetical
cases involving the initial establishment of a support order, that
FFCCSOA does not apply unless a support order has been en-
tered." These cases, therefore, will be decided under applicable
state law, including UIFSA.
Case 1. Establishing a support order in connection with a
divorce; a single petition is filed and the spouses reside in two
different states.
Case 1(a): NCP moves out of the marital state. H, W, and C
reside in State 1 during their marriage of five years. H and W
separate and H/NCP moves to State 2. W/CP and C continue to
reside in State 1. W/CP seeks a divorce, child support, and
spousal support in State ."
This is probably the most simple two-state hypothetical that
32 The only relevance of FFCCSOA, before a support order is ever entered, is
that in order for a support order to be given full faith and credit under FFCCSOA,
the court issuing the order must have had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
matter and personal jurisdiction over the contestants, who must have been given
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(c) (West Supp.
1996).
For a case with facts similar to Case 1(a), except that the wife did not seek
spousal support, see Taylor v. Taylor, 672 A.2d 44,46 (Del. 1996).
Case 1(a) ignores considerations of child custody jurisdiction, which is deter-
mined under the state's enacted version of the UCCJA. See Juliet A. Cox, Note, Ju-
dicial Wandering Through a Legislative Maze: Application of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to Child Cus-
tody Determinations, 58 Mo. L. REV. 427, 437 (1993) (explaining that where UCCJA
grants more than one forum jurisdiction, it generally "provides that [child custody]
jurisdiction rightfully vests in the court in which the action was first pending"). The
PKPA does not strictly apply unless a custody order has been entered, except that
the PKPA would deny full faith and credit to an order that was not "made consis-
tently with the provisions of [the PKPA] by a court of another State." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(a) (1994); see Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 672 F. Supp. 464, 465 (D. Colo. 1987).
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can be imagined. A state court must have personal jurisdiction
over the obligor to order a support obligation as part of a divorce
decree.' UIFSA section 201 enumerates eight bases for a court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident obligor in
any action where support is sought." In Case 1(a), UIFSA sec-
tion 201(3)"6 provides a basis for the exercise of personal juris-
diction over HLNCP for the establishment of child support be-
cause H/NCP once lived in State 1 with C.
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Personal jurisdiction over the
respondent is not generally considered necessary for the court to grant a divorce or
to render a child custody decree. For jurisdiction to grant a divorce, all that is con-
stitutionally required is that one of the spouses be domiciled in the state. Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409-10 (1975); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99
(1942). Most commentators consider the UCCJA, rather than traditional concepts of
personal jurisdiction, to govern child custody jurisdiction. See generally BRILMAYER,
supra note 10, at 343, 364-69; Bruch, supra note 29, at 1051-53. But see Linda M.
Denelis, Interstate Child Custody and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The
Continuing Search for a National Standard, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1329, 1353 (1994)
(suggesting that dicta in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990),
"implied that personal jurisdiction over an absent parent was necessary to decide
child custody"). These jurisdictional oddities created the concept of "divisible di-
vorce," where one court might grant the divorce, another court might order support,
and a third court might decide child custody. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354
U.S. 416, 418-19 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1948).
USCICS, established as a part of the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485, § 126 (1988), debated whether to recommend that Congress enact a statute
providing for "child-state" jurisdiction under which the courts of the state where the
child resides would have jurisdiction over any person legally responsible for the
child's support. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 82-84; Sampson, supra
note 12, at 112-13 n.42. Some commentators have argued that such a statute enact-
ing child-state jurisdiction would be constitutional despite Kulko. See Bruch, supra
note 29, at 1053-57; Ann Bradford Stevens, Is Failure To Support A Minor Child In
The State Sufficient Contact With That State To Justify In Personam Jurisdiction?,
17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 491, 509-13 (1993). But see Monica J. Allen, Child-State Jurisdic-
tion: A Due Process Invitation to Reconsider Some Basic Family Law Assumptions,
26 FAM. L.Q. 293, 301 (1992) ("The Supreme Court can probably only uphold child-
state jurisdiction by overruling, either explicitly or implicitly, Kulko v. Superior
Court."). USCICS ultimately decided not to recommend the adoption of "child-state"
jurisdiction.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUrPPORT ACT § 201.
"In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support order or to deter-
mine parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident individual [or the individual's guardian or conservator] if... (3) the in-
dividual resided with the child in this State." Id. State 1 could also assert personal
jurisdiction over the husband in this hypothetical under UIFSA § 201(4)-(6). Id. §
201(4) ("[Ihe individual resided in this State and provided prenatal expenses or
support for the child."); id. § 201(5) ("[Tlhe child resides in this State as a result of
the acts or directives of the individual"); id. § 201(6) ("[T]he individual engaged in
sexual intercourse in this State and the child may have been conceived by that act of
intercourse.").
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Only UIFSA subsections 201(1), 201(2), and 201(8), however,
could provide a statutory basis for asserting personal jurisdiction
to establish spousal support." A court acquires personal juris-
diction to establish spousal support under UIFSA if H is served
with process in State 1," submits to State l's jurisdiction,39 or if
any other constitutional basis for exercising personal jurisdiction
exists." State l's assertion of jurisdiction over H to establish
spousal support easily satisfies the Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence. H maintained intentional and extensive contacts
with State 1 by residing there for five years, thus availing him-
self of the privileges and benefits of State l's laws; the litigation
is closely related to those contacts (H lived there with W and C,
the present claimants); and State 1 has an interest in affording
complete relief to W and C. Under these circumstances, it is un-
likely that State l's jurisdiction over H would offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."41
37 UIFSA § 201 provides:
[A] tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent individual ... if- (1) the individual is personally served with [citation,
summons, notice] within this State; (2) the individual submits to the juris-
diction of this State by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by
filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to
personal jurisdiction; ... or (8) there is any other basis consistent with the
constitutions of this State and the United States for the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Id. § 201.
38 Id. § 201(1). The Court upheld the constitutionality of in-state service of proc-
ess as an independent basis of personal jurisdiction in Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604 (1990). Justice Brennan's concurrence, joined by three other justices,
left open the possibility, however, that a defendant could have so few contacts with
a state that the exercise of personal jurisdiction, even with in-state service of proc-
ess on the defendant, might violate due process. Id. at 628-40.
39 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201(2); see McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
40 In addition to UIFSA, a state may also have a long-arm statute that can be
used to establish jurisdiction for spousal support. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 223A, § 3(g) (West 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(b) (McKinney 1997); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 104 (West 1996) ("A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person, whether or not a resident of this state, who lived within this state in a mari-
tal or parental relationship, or both, as to all obligations for alimony and child sup-
port where the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this
state .... "). UIFSA's drafters did not include "the most obvious basis for asserting
long-arm jurisdiction over spousal support, i.e., 'last matrimonial domicile,' " to
avoid the possibility that a court might have jurisdiction to order spousal support
but not to divide property. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt.
' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Mil-
liken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
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Since State 1 can directly exercise personal jurisdiction over
H, it is considered a "one-state" proceeding rather than a true
UIFSA "two state" proceeding.42 Even in a "one-state" proceed-
ing, however, UIFSA requires State 1 to use innovative rules of
evidence and discovery to streamline procedures when one of the
litigants is a nonresident.43
Finally, the hypothetical provides that W seeks relief in
State 1. Even though W can establish personal jurisdiction over
H in State 1, she has alternatives to proceeding in this manner.
She could either file an action for child and spousal support di-
rectly in State 24 or "initiate a two-state action under the suc-
ceeding provisions of UIFSA seeking to establish a support order
in the respondent's state of residence."45 In the latter case, W
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (stating that due process requires that individuals have
"fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign") (citation omitted); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770 (1984).
42 The official comment to UIFSA § 201 provides:
In situations in which the long-arm statute can be satisfied, the petitioner
(either the obligor or the obligee) has two options: (1) utilize the long-arm
statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent; or (2) initiate a
two-state action under the succeeding provisions of UIFSA seeking to es-
tablish a support order in the respondent's state of residence.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt. The drafters favored a one-state
proceeding whenever possible. Id. ("The frequency of a two-state procedure involv-
ing the participation of tribunals in both states should be substantially reduced by
the introduction of this long-arm statute.").
43 See id. §§ 202; 316, 318. In order to facilitate the gathering of information,
traditional hearsay, authentication, and "best evidence" rules are greatly relaxed.
Id. at § 316(b)-(e). Certified copies of records and bills are admissible to establish
that payments were made as well as the reasonableness of charges. Id. § 316 (c)-(d).
Out-of-state witnesses may testify by telephone from a designated location or tribu-
nal within that state. Id. § 316(f). Certain testimonial privileges are inapplicable.
For example, adverse inferences may be drawn if a party refuses to answer on the
grounds of self-incrimination. Id. § 316(g). The spousal communication privilege and
immunity defense are also not applicable. Id. § 316 (h)-(i). Moreover, the State 1 tri-
bunal may request a State 2 tribunal to compel NCP to respond to a State 1 discov-
ery order. Id. § 318(2).
44UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 103 cmt. ("[A] petitioner may de-
cide to file an original action for child support ... directly in the state of residence of
the respondent and proceed under that forum's generally applicable support law. In
so doing, the petitioner thereby submits to the personal jurisdiction of the forum
and foregoes reliance on UIFSAP"); see Sampson, supra note 12, at 111 n.39 (noting
that although this alternative entails expense of hiring private counsel and possible
disadvantageous application of State 2's laws, it may provide most expedient
method of resolving dispute). Depending on State 2's domiciliary requirements for
divorce jurisdiction, W might also file for divorce in State 2. See infra note 50.
4* UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt.; id. § 401(a) ("If a support
order entitled to recognition under this [Act] has not been issued, a responding tri-
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would follow the two-state procedure outlined in Case 4(a) be-
low4" and simply seek to establish, rather than enforce, a support
obligation.
An interesting choice-of-law issue arises since W/CP has
three alternatives: (1) filing in State 1; (2) filing in State 2; or (3)
initiating a UIFSA proceeding in State 1 to be forwarded to
State 2. 4' UIFSA provides a clear solution to this problem. If the
case is filed in State 1, then the law of State 1 applies. If the
case is filed in or forwarded to State 2, then the law of State 2
applies.48 Competent counsel, therefore, should ascertain the law
of both State 1 and State 2 to determine which state's law is
more favorable to the client before filing suit.
49
Case 1(b): CP and C move out of marital state. H, W, and C
reside in State 1 during the marriage of five years. H and W
separate. W/CP and C move to State 2 and satisfy State 2's
domiciliary requirement for divorce jurisdiction. W/CP seeks di-
vorce, child support, and spousal support in State 2.
W may obtain a dissolution of marriage in State 2 since she
bunal of this State may issue a support order if- (1) the individual seeking the order
resides in another state; or (2) the support enforcement agency seeking the order is
located in another state.). For a modified example of such a two-state establish-
ment proceeding under URESA, see Kansas v. Briggs, 925 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
" See infra notes 103-53 and accompanying text; see also supra note 12
(describing procedures necessary to initiate "two-state" action).
47 See infra notes 98-153 and accompanying text.
4 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 202 (providing that, except for
special evidence and discovery rules, state's "tribunal shall apply the procedural and
substantive law of this State" when exercising jurisdiction over nonresident pursu-
ant to UIFSA's long-arm section); id. § 303 ("[A] responding tribunal of this State:
(1) shall apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on choice of
law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this State ... ; and (2)
shall determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the
law and support guidelines of this State."); see also Sampson, supra note 12, at 144
n.112 (stating that in two-state establishment proceeding, "local law rather than the
law of the initiating state applies").
'9 For example, on exactly the same facts, the application of State l's child support
guidelines could result in a significantly higher or lower child support obligation than
the application of State 2's guidelines. See Elortegui v. Elortegui, 616 So. 2d 69, 70
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (applying law of issuing state, rather than law of obligor's
new state of residence, and enforcing award of support to adult child enrolled as fill-
time student); In re Marriage of Abel, 886 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that Washington and Montana child support worksheets yielded monthly obli-
gations of $563.16 and $340.01, respectively; forum state applied its own guidelines);
see also Melli, supra note 2, at 486 (noting that applicable law in two-state proceeding
is usually law of parent's state while one-state proceedings generally are governed by
law of state in which child resides).
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has met the domiciliary requirements necessary for State 2 to
exercise divorce jurisdiction." There is no basis, however, with-
out additional facts, for State 2 to exercise personal jurisdiction
over H."' Therefore, W must either file for a divorce and support
in State 1 or file a two-state proceeding for support in State 2
which is forwarded to State 1.52
Case 1(c): Variation on facts to test UIFSA's personal juris-
diction provisions. H and W live in State 1 and C1 is born in
State 1 in 1994. H, W, and C1 move to State 2 in January, 1995
and C2 is born in State 2 in July, 1995. C3 is born in State 2 in
1996. W and all three C return to State 1 where W seeks a di-
vorce and child support for all three C. H remains outside
State 1. The question then arises as to whether State 1 may ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction over H to order support for all three
children.
Case 1(c) is a modification of the facts of Abu-Dalbouh v.
Abu-Dalbouh,53 a recent Minnesota case decided under UIFSA.
On the facts of Case 1(c), State 1 has jurisdiction to order H to
pay support for C1 because H and C1 resided in the same house-
hold within State 1. State 1 may also have jurisdiction to order
H to pay support for C2 if H resided in State 1 and provided pre-
natal expenses or support for C2"5 or if C2 may have been con-
ceived in State 1.56
5o Most states require a spouse to have been domiciled, or to have resided in, the
state for a prescribed time period before the state's courts can take jurisdiction of a
petition for dissolution of marriage. CLARK, supra note 12, at 413; see, e.g., N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney 1996) (one or two years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 102 (West 1996) (six months). In this and all remaining hypotheticals, it is as-
sumed that a party seeking a divorce in a given state has lived in that state long
enough to satisfy the domiciliary requirement.
S See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201.
2 Id. § 401(a); see, e.g., Deltoro v. McMullen, 471 S.E.2d 742 (S.C. Ct. App.
1996); Hubanks v. Hubanks, 555 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). For a description
of two-state enforcement proceedings, see infra notes 101-57 and accompanying
text.
-547 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). In Abu-Dalbouh, the court awarded
child support only for the oldest of three children. Id. at 705. The oldest child was
conceived, born, and resided in Minnesota with both parents. Id. The two youngest
children were born in Jordan and had never resided with their father in Minnesota.
Id. at 702. The court reasoned that since none of the factors enumerated in
UIFSA § 201 applied to the younger children, support could be awarded only for the
oldest child. Id. at 705.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201(3).
Id. § 201(4).
"Id. § 201(6).
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State 1 may not, however, possess the necessary jurisdiction
over H to order H to provide support for C3. The court in Abu-
Dalbouh ordered H to pay child support for C1, but not for C2 or
C3." The Abu-Dalbouh court may have been too conservative in
exercising its jurisdiction since the bifurcation of the father's
support obligation of his three children may not be required by
either UIFSA or the Constitution.
The language of UIFSA section 201 does not neatly encom-
pass this hypothetical; it speaks of one "child," not a spillover
jurisdictional sweep covering the support of all siblings when the
jurisdictional prerequisite for a single child is met.5 8 Yet, the
policy behind section 201 is "to give the tribunals in the home
state of the supported family the maximum possible opportunity
to secure personal jurisdiction over an absent respondent."59 Ac-
cordingly, section 201 includes a "catch-all" provision which al-
lows the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent individual to the maximum extent allowed by the
Constitution.0
Thus, the question remains whether State I can constitu-
tionally exercise personal jurisdiction over H to order child sup-
port for C3 when jurisdiction over H to order child support for C1
and, most likely, C2 already exists. C3 is H's child and is part of
the same family that H resided with in State 1 prior to the birth
of C3. It is foreseeable, therefore, that H may someday be sub-
ject to an adjudication in State 1 of his support obligations to his
family.61 H is already subject to State l's jurisdiction for some of
the support obligations, so the added inconvenience of litigating
the C3 obligation in State 1 is minimal and evidence regarding
57 Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d at 705. Unlike the hypothetical Case 1(c), the facts
of Abu-Dalbouh did not permit the possible imputation to F of sexual intercourse
conceiving C2 in State 1.
"' See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201.
'9 Id, prefatory note.
60 Id. § 201(8).
61 Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant who has not consented to suit there, [the] "fair warning" re-
quirement is satisfied if the defendant has "purposefully directed" his ac-
tivities at residents of the forum ... and the litigation results from alleged
injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citations omitted); cf.
Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Minn. 1981) (suggesting, but not decid-
ing, that non-support could constitute an "[aict outside the state causing injury or
damage within the state" thus subjecting non-paying spouse to state's long-arm ju-
risdiction).
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H's income will already be before the court. 2 State 1, where W
and her children reside, has an interest in providing a forum
where W may obtain the maximum amount of child support.3
Thus, as with the discussion of spousal support jurisdiction
above, State l's exercise of personal jurisdiction over H to decide
the spectrum of support obligations appears well within the lim-
its of due process.
Case 2. Competing petitions for support filed in two different
states.
Case 2(a): Child support sought and the child has a "home
state." H, W, and C reside in State 1 during the marriage of five
years. H and W separate. H moves to State 2, where he resides
for State 2's requisite domiciliary period, and then files a divorce
petition seeking child custody and child support. W files a
timely motion to dismiss H's petition for lack of jurisdiction and
files her own divorce petition in State 1, seeking child custody
and child support.
The first question raised by this hypothetical is whether
State 1 can assume jurisdiction of W's petition, even though H
filed his petition first. UIFSA section 204(a) provides that it
can.6 State 1 can assume jurisdiction since W filed her petition
in State 1 before the time to respond to the State 2 petition ex-
pired, she challenged jurisdiction in State 2 within the necessary
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 638-39 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (discussing factor of inconvenience to defendant).
"See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 ("A State generally has a 'manifest interest
in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by
out-of-state actors.") (citations omitted).
'4 UIFSA § 204(a) provides:
A tribunal of this State may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support or-
der if the [petition] or comparable pleading is filed after a pleading is filed
in another state only if:
(1) the [petition] or comparable pleading in this State is fied before
the expiration of the time allowed in the other state for filing a re-
sponsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other
state;
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction
in the other state; and
(3) if relevant, this State is the home state of the child.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAILY SUPPORT ACT § 204(a). This provision significantly
changes the law under RURESA, which prohibited the responding state from stay-
ing the proceeding even if there was a pending divorce action in another state.
REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 30, 9B U.L.A. 529
(1987).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
time period, and State 1 is the child's "home state."65 In accord
with the PKPA, the official UIFSA commentary states that the
child's home state has priority as the governing forum:66
In this regard, UIFSA marks a significant departure from the
approach adopted by UCCJA, which chooses "first filing" as the
method for resolving competing jurisdictional disputes. In the
analogous situation, the federal PKPA chooses the home state of
the child to establish priority. Given the preemptive nature of
the PKPA and the likelihood that both custody and support are
involved in most cases, UIFSA opts for the federal method of re-
solving disputes between competing jurisdictional assertions by
establishing a priority for the tribunal in the child's home state.
If there is no home state, "first filing" controls.
Thus, if one state is the child's "home state," UIFSA provides
a simple, although not entirely satisfactory, answer to the juris-
dictional dispute. UIFSA's drafters believed that the PKPA
would give State 1, C's home state, jurisdictional priority over
the custody dispute." They intended the child support issue to
be heard with the custody issue, "which would be an efficient use
of resources."69 Strictly following UIFSA section 204(b), the
6 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101(4) defines "Home state" of
child as:
the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent
for at least six consecutive months preceding the time of filing of a
[petition] or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is less than six
months old, the state in which the child lived from birth with any of them.
A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the six-
month or other period.
Id. § 101(4). Custody practitioners and others will recognize this as essentially the
definition of the child's "home state" contained in UCCJA § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 133
(1988), and the PKPA. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (1994).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1994). The goals of this section include: (1) es-
tablishing national standards for courts to determine jurisdiction in child custody
disputes, see Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-611, § 7(b)
(congressional statement of purpose); (2) discouraging forum shopping, see Tufares
v. Wright, 644 P.2d 522, 525 (N.M. 1982); and (3) preventing the issuance of incon-
sistent judicial decrees, see Nielsen v. Nielsen, 472 So. 2d 133, 136 (La. Ct. App.
1985); Holm v. Smilowitz, 615 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
67UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmt.; see also BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM, supra note 1, at 87-88.
's See Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1992) (concluding that home
state jurisdiction preempted sister state with significant connection). But see Lustig
v. Lustig, No. C4-96-940 1996 WL 679693 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1996); Goldstein,
supra note 24, at 925 ("Although courts routinely enforce initial decrees made by
courts with home state jurisdiction, they occasionally refuse to do so.").
'9 BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 88.
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State 2 court should grant W's motion to the extent that H seeks
a support order."
The drafters incorrectly assumed that the court of the child's
home state would always exercise custody jurisdiction. In a case
similar to Case 2(a), a South Dakota court declined to exercise
custody jurisdiction even though South Dakota was the child's
home state and H, a South Dakota resident, had filed his divorce
petition first." The court remanded the case for findings on sup-
port jurisdiction. 2 If UIFSA section 204 is strictly construed on
remand, South Dakota will have jurisdiction of the support is-
sues. Thus, the burgeoning UIFSA case law has already pro-
duced a case in which UIFSA may cause, rather than prevent,
the bifurcation of custody and support issues.
Case 2(b): Child support sought and the child has no "home
state." H, W, and C reside in State 1 for two months, then reside
in State 2 for one month. H and W separate. H moves back to
State 1, where he files a divorce petition seeking spousal sup-
port, custody, and child support. Within the time limit for con-
testing State l's jurisdiction, W files a motion to dismiss H's pe-
tition for lack of jurisdiction and files her own divorce petition in
State 2, seeking spousal support, custody, and child support.
Case 2(c): Only spousal support sought. During their mar-
riage, H and W reside for five years in State 1 and then move to
State 2 for a year. H and W separate. H returns to State 1,
where he files a divorce petition seeking spousal support. W files
a timely motion to dismiss H's petition for lack of jurisdiction
and files her own divorce petition in State 2, seeking spousal
support.
In Case 2(b), there is no home state of the child.74 In Case
7o Since UIFSA does not affect State 2's jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage,
UIFSA does not dictate that State 2 grant W's motion to dismiss the entire action
because H seeks a divorce decree as well as support. As a matter of comity and ju-
dicial economy, however, State 2 should dismiss H's entire petition to avoid bifur-
cated proceedings since State 2 is required to dismiss H's petition for support.
7' Lustig, 1996 WL 679693 at * 2-3.
7 Id. at *3.
73 See infra notes 314-19 and accompanying text (proposing amendments to
UIFSA § 204 which rectify potential bifurcation problems).
'7 If a child has not "lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least
six consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of" the support pe-
tition, there is no "home state." UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101(4); cf.
St. Andrie v. St. Andrie, 473 So. 2d 140, 144 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that child
lacked "home state" under UCCJA where child spent 3-1/2 months in Georgia and 2-
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2(c), there is no child at all; only spousal support is sought.
While UIFSA section 204 clearly prioritizes competing peti-
tions where child support is sought for a child with a home state,
it operates somewhat ambiguously where there is no home state
or, indeed, no child. Under section 204(a), a court may take ju-
risdiction of a second-filed support proceeding if certain time
limits are met75 and "if relevant, [the state in which the second-
filed support proceeding commenced] is the home state of the
child. 76
The clause "if relevant" creates unnecessary confusion. Does
the phrase mean if there is no child's home state (or no child),
this factor is not "relevant" and, therefore, need not be met? Un-
der this interpretation, the only requirements for the court to as-
sume jurisdiction would be the satisfaction of mere filing time
limits. Simply challenging the first petition and filing the second
petition on time cannot be sufficient conditions to allow the sec-
ond-filed court to proceed in favor of the first. Such a statutory
construction would operate as an absolute "second-filed" priority
and would contain no more, and possibly less, merit than an
automatic "first-filed" rule.
Another possible construction of section 204(a)(3) is that the
state of the second-filed proceeding must be the home state of
some child to trump the first-filed state's jurisdiction. Under
this interpretation, if there is no home state, or no child, then
the first-filed state would have priority. Such a reading, how-
ever, renders the words "if relevant" superfluous. The same re-
sult could be reached by amending section 204(a)(3) to provide
that the second-filed state "is the home state of a child for whom
child support is sought."
77
Despite this possible drafting error, UIFSA's official com-
mentary clearly supports the latter suggested construction. The
commentary flatly states that "[i]f there is no home state, 'first
filing' controls," and suggests that this is "the approach adopted
by UCCJA."78 In general, that statement is true: under UCCJA,
1/2 months in Louisiana).
7" UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204(a)(1)-(2). These time limits are
assumed to be met in this hypothetical.
76 Id. § 204(a)(3) (emphasis added).
77 See infra Part II(A) and Appendix (proposing clarifications to this section).
78 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmt. The members of USCICS
shared this view. See BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 88 ("[Tlhe defendant
may only claim the child's home state as an alternative to the state asserting juris-
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a State 2 court should not exercise custody jurisdiction if a cus-
tody proceeding is already pending in State L" The UCCJA,
however, contains several exceptions to this general rule which
are not contained in UIFSA. For example, under UCCJA, the
court addressing the first-filed petition may decline to exercise
jurisdiction "any time before making a decree if it finds that it is
an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under
the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is
a more appropriate forum."" In addition, the court addressing
the first-filed petition may decline to exercise jurisdiction "[i]f
the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child
from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible con-
duct."s
Under the UCCJA, even if State 1 determined that it had
child custody jurisdiction,82 it could decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion because the child currently resides in State 2.83 Despite the
commentary's claim that UIFSA section 204 is "similar to Sec-
tion 6 of the [UCCJA],"' the language of UIFSA section 204 does
not appear to afford similar discretionary power to decline ju-
diction.").
7" UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 6(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 219-20 (1988).
But see Goldstein, supra note 24, at 888-93 (suggesting that some courts do not de-
fer to pending custody proceedings in another state despite UCCJA section 6).
"0 UNIT. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 7(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 233 (1988).
UCCJA section 7(c) lists certain factors the court may consider in "determining if it
is an inconvenient forum." These factors include: whether another state recently
constituted the child's "home state"; whether an alternative state has greater inter-
est in child's welfare; availability of evidence; and the parties' choice of alternative
forum. Id. § 7(c), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 233.
' Id. § 8(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 251.
"2 State 1 could conceivably assert custody jurisdiction under the "significant
connection" jurisdiction of UCCJA § 3(a)(2):
[It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume ju-
risdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is
available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present
or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 143.
' See id. § 7(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 233; id. § 7(c), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 233. The PKPA also
does not adopt an inflexible "first filed" rule in the absence of a child's home state.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1994) (giving jurisdictional priority to state with
"significant connections" to child when there is no home state).
" UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 1996); see also
Robert E. Oliphant, Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 989, 1014-15 (1996)
(noting that, unlike PKPA, privilege of declining jurisdiction is not contained within
UIFSA).
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risdiction. UIFSA's drafters clearly intended to have a single
court decide child support and child custody issues together.85
That intention is thwarted if UIFSA does not allow State 1 the
same flexibility as UCCJA to decline jurisdiction. The commen-
tary hints at such flexibility:
[The one-order system] requires cooperation between, and def-
erence by, sister-state tribunals in order to avoid issuance of
competing support orders. To this end, tribunals are expected
to take an active role in seeking out information about support
proceedings in other states concerning the same child. Depend-
ing on the circumstances, one or the other of two tribunals con-
sidering the same support obligation should decide to defer to
the other.86
Thus, in Case 2(b), if the State 1 court decided under
UCCJA sections 6 and 7 that custody proceedings should be
stayed in favor of the second-filed proceeding in State 2, then,
despite the potentially contrary language of UIFSA section
204(a)(3), 7 the child support request should follow the custody
request to State 2. If the State 1 court chooses to exercise cus-
tody jurisdiction, then the support issue should remain with the
custody issue in State 1.
The drafters failed to enunciate policy considerations to
guide the court in applying UIFSA section 204(a) where, as in
Case 2(c), only spousal support is sought. The drafters appar-
ently crafted UIFSA's rules concerning simultaneous proceedings
in two states with child support, not spousal support, in mind.
8" See BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 88 (asserting that adjudicating
child support and custody issues in same forum promotes efficient use of judicial
resources); Sampson, supra note 12, at 119 n.63 ("Bifurcated decisions are interest-
ing for law school hypotheticals, but should be avoided in real life at almost any
cost"); see also Chauncey Brummer, Statutory Primer: The Uniform Interstate Fam-
ily Support Act, 1994 ARK. L. NOTES 77, 80 (1994) ("UIFSA enhances the likelihood
that both child support and child custody will be brought before the same court.").
'6 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmt.; see also Brummer, supra
note 85, at 80 ("This approach necessitates cooperation among the states in furnish-
ing information relevant to child support and proceedings which may be pending in
their respective states."). Moreover, UIFSA section 317, which authorizes communi-
cations between tribunals of different states to ascertain the status of a proceeding
in another state, was "derived from UCCJA § 7(d) (Inconvenient Forum)." UNIF.
INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 317 cmt. This suggests that UIFSA's drafters
may have envisioned a similar "inconvenient forum" determination for competing
support proceedings.
See infra Part II(A) and Appendix (proposing amendments to prevent such
bifurcated proceedings).
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First, to conform with the federal PKPA, they chose the child's
"home state" as the forum of priority." Second, in the absence of
a home state, the drafters of UIFSA chose the "first filed" forum
as the forum of priority to conform with UCCJA. 9 The rationale
underlying these rules, keeping custody and child support deci-
sions in a single forum, is irrelevant where only spousal support
is sought.
When the parties seek only spousal support, section 204
thus provides a black-letter, first-filed rule which lacks an ap-
parent policy rationale (besides the unexpressed rationale that
even a bad clear rule at least reduces litigation expense and un-
certainty)." In Case 2(c), if State 1 decides it has personal ju-
risdiction over W, then UIFSA section 204(a) probably prevents
State 2 from exercising jurisdiction over W's second-filed support
proceeding. Normally, this may not make much sense, but duel-
ing petitions for spousal support alone appear to be rare.91
"8 "Given the preemptive nature of the PKPA, and the possibility that custody
and support are both involved in the case, UIFSA opts for the federal method of re-
solving disputes between competing jurisdictional assertions by establishing a prior-
ity for the tribunal in the child's home state." UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT
ACT § 204 cmt. "To the extent [they] conflict, the PKPA preempts the UCCJA."
Linda D. Elrod, Summary of the Year in Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 485, 501 (1994).
"PKPA, which preempts UCCJA under the Supremacy Clause, provides that if a
'home state' exists, a state assessing enforcement need not consider whether an-
other state has a 'significant connection' to the child." Fielding, supra note 12, at
432. "PKPA supersedes UCCJA and favors the child's home state in determining the
jurisdiction of a child custody dispute." Id. at 433; see Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d
816, 819 (Ark 1992) (holding that PKPA preempts UCCJA) (citing Norsworthy v.
Norsworthy, 713 S.W.2d 451 (Ark. 1986)); Michalik v. Michalik, 494 N.W.2d 391,
394 (Wis. 1993) (holding that PKPA preempts UCCJA to extent they conflict).
89 "If the child has no home state, 'first filing' controls." UNIF. INTERSTATE
FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §204 cmt. "Section 204 of UIFSA contains provisions similar
to those in the UCCJA. UCCJA provides a 'first filing' method for resolving prob-
lems of competing jurisdictions." Fielding, supra note 12, at 458 (footnote omitted).
"Rather than applying a 'first filing' approach, such as that used by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, to resolve jurisdictional disputes, UIFSA establishes
priority for the tribunal in the child's home state." Oliphant, supra note 84, at 1030.
"Only if there is no home state does Tirst filing' control." Id.
Cf. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 29 (1976) ("Where, as is the case with law, some of the rules of con-
duct are deliberately laid down by authority, they will thus perform their function
only if they become the basis of the planning of the individuals."); Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1978) (stating
that, to foster predictability, "[t~here are times when even a bad rule is better than
no rule at all").
9' See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(f) (stating that court issu-
ing spousal support order has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order); cf.
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Case 3. Establishing a child support order where the parents
have never been married and they reside in two states. F, M,
and C reside in State 1. F and M are not married. F moves to
State 2. How can M establish a support order against F?
Since the parents were never married, a judicial finding of
F's parentage is a prerequisite to the establishment of a support
obligation.92 Once parentage is established, M can either file a
"one-state" proceeding in State 1" or initiate a "two-state"
UIFSA proceeding in State 1, which will be forwarded to State 2,
the responding state.94
If M files a "one-state" proceeding in State 1, State 1 will
have personal jurisdiction over F under either subsection (3) or
subsection (4) of UIFSA section 201. State 1 will apply its own
procedural and substantive law to determine F's parentage and
the resulting child support obligation.95 This option should be
Sampson, supra note 12, at 121 n.69 ("The avoidance of interstate modification of
alimony decrees reflects, at least in part, the disinterest in the topic of the Drafting
Committee and its co-reporters, advisors and observers. Throughout the revision
process the focus of all concerned was almost entirely on child support.").
92 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201. Such a finding is not nec-
essary in a divorce proceeding since the husband is presumed to be the father of any
children of the marriage. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 298 (1987); State
ex rel. Clanton v. Clanton, No. A-95-361, 1996 WL 456037, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug.
13, 1996) ("The legitimacy of all children conceived before the commencement of the
dissolution of marriage suit shall be presumed until the contrary is shown."); see
also Pierce v. Pierce, 374 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing statu-
tory presumption that husband was natural father under Uniform Parentage Act);
Williams v. Milliken, 506 A.2d 918, 924-25 (Pa. Super. 1996) (discussing presump-
tion that husband is natural father of child).
9' See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt.; see supra notes 42-43
and accompanying text.
9' See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 701(a) (providing guidelines for
proceedings to determine parentage); see also Davis v. Child Support Enforcement
Unit, 933 S.W.2d 798, 798 (Ark. 1996) (reviewing case where Minnesota mother
properly filed paternity and support petition in Minnesota court which forwarded it
to Arkansas court for hearing); Neville v. Perry, 648 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (Fain. Ct.
1996) (Texas Attorney General initiated paternity action and then forwarded peti-
tion to New York for hearing). In addition, UIFSA:
permits the direct filing of an interstate action in the responding state
without an initial filing in an initiating tribunal. Thus ... a petitioner in
one state may seek to establish a support order in a second state by either
filing in the responding state's tribunal or by directly seeking the assis-
tance of the support enforcement agency in the second state.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 265.
9" At some point, enforcement of the support obligation obtained in State 1 may
be necessary in State 2, the state where F resides. See BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, su-
pra note 1, at 36 ("A support order obtained through the assertion of a long-arm
statute must still be enforced in the state in which the absent party resides."); see
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more advantageous to M since State 1, where M resides, will re-
tain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order.96 Litigation
in M's state of residence probably enhances her ability to retain
private counsel and eases the prosecutorial logistics.97
If M chooses to file a "two-state" UIFSA proceeding," State 1
will be the initiating state and will forward the necessary docu-
ments to State 2, the responding state.99 The State 2 court will
apply State 2's procedural and substantive law, including rules
on choice of law, to determine F's parentage"' and the resulting
also Brummer, supra note 85, at 79 ("Non-residents subject to jurisdiction under the
Act's one-state (long arm) provision are covered by this state's substantive and pro-
cedural law governing the enforcement of child support."). For hypotheticals ad-
dressing enforcement, see Cases 4-6 infra.
98 Brummer, supra note 85, at 81 (discussing application of UIFSA and benefits
of utilizing "one-state" proceeding). "Section 205 of UIFSA provides that a state tri-
bunal which issues a support order retains jurisdiction over that order while that
state is the residence of the obligor, obligee, or child who will benefit from the sup-
port order." Fielding, supra note 12, at 459. Section 205 can serve to discourage fo-
rum shopping by preventing the obligor from avoiding his support obligation by
moving to another state and forcing the obligee to incur the expense of litigating in
another state. Id. at 459-460.
97 UIFSA's drafters preferred the one-state proceeding where possible. See
Brummer, supra note 85, at 78 ("To the extent UIFSA broadens the basis for exer-
cising personal jurisdiction in a single state, there is the opportunity to avoid the
many uncertainties and extensive delay in the two-step (two-state) procedure."); su-
pra note 42.
93 For a more extensive discussion of two-state proceedings, see Case 4(a), infra
notes 101-53 and accompanying text.
9 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 701(a) (amended 1996); see State ex
rel. Clanton v. Clanton, No. A-95-361, 1996 WL 456037 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1996)
(forwarding petition to State 2 in case decided under RURESA where F moved to
State 2, M moved to State 3, and M filed RURESA petition in State 3 seeking to es-
tablish paternity and support obligation). "he authorized court in the initiating
state is referred to as the initiating tribunal, and its responsibility is to forward
copies of the petition and its accompanying documents to the responding state and
the responding tribunal or appropriate support enforcement agency in the respond-
ing state." Brummer, supra note 85, at 78.
'o See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 701(b) ("In a proceeding to de-
termine parentage, a responding tribunal of this State shall apply the [Uniform
Parentage Act; procedural and substantive law of this State,] and the rules of this
State on choice of law."). The differences in the laws and procedures of State 1 and
State 2 regarding the determination of parentage may be substantial. See
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 121.
M or F may also use UIFSA simply to determine parentage without seeking a
support order. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 701(a). But see OCSE
HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 3-EP-1 (stating that, in interstate IV-D cases under
UIFSA, child support orders should be sought since "the initiating State cannot pick
and choose the services to be provided by the responding State" and that "it remains
the responsibility of the responding State to provide the full range of appropriate
services."). Title IV of the Social Security Act requires states "as a condition of re-
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child support obligation.'O
B. Cases 4-6: Enforcement and Modification of an Existing
Support Order.
The remaining cases assume that the initial support order
has been established. When a party seeks to enforce or modify
that order, the federal FFCCSOA, as well as UIFSA, must be
considered.
Case 4. Divorce in State 1, NCP moves to State 2.102
Case 4(a): CP seeks enforcement. H and W are divorced in
State 1. State 1 orders H, the NCP, to pay child support and
alimony to W, the CP. H/NCP moves to State 2 and stops paying
child support and alimony.
UIFSA offers four alternatives that enable W to enforce the
State 1 support order without hiring an attorney in State 2: (1)
the two-state enforcement procedure;' (2) direct recognition of
an income-withholding order by NCP's employer in State 2;'04 (3)
ceiving federal AFDC funding, to provide free child support enforcement services to
both AFDC recipients and other custodial parents." Kathleen A. Burdette, Com-
ment, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Support Enforcement After United
States v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1473 (1996). "A custodial parent in a low-
or middle-income family may seek assistance through his or her local child support
enforcement agency. The agency may enforce the collection of support under Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act .... Title IV-D authorizes funding for the agency to
locate absent parents, establish paternity, and obtain child and spousal support."
Sharon A. Drew, Remedies for Nonpayment, 16 FAM. ADvoC. 36, 36 (1993).
'0' UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 401. UIFSA section 401
"authorizes a tribunal of the responding state to issue temporary and permanent
support orders binding on an obligor over whom the tribunal has personal jurisdic-
tion." Id. § 401 cmt. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the establishment
of paternity in an interstate proceeding based on the affidavits of the mother and a
blood-test expert did not violate the father's Sixth Amendment right of confronta-
tion when the father failed to utilize UIFSA section 316(f) to obtain the mother's
testimony by telephone. Davis v. Child Support Enforcement Unit, 933 S.W.2d 798,
799-800 (Ark. 1996).
102 In this and the following hypotheticals unless otherwise noted, it is assumed
that NCP is the only party ordered to pay child support.
103 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 301 cmt. (stating that two-
state enforcement proceeding contemplated in UIFSA section 301 is derived from
two-state procedure of RURESA); Brummer, supra note 85, at 78 ("When there ex-
ists no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident obligor the Act
[UIFSA] resorts to the RURESA model using an initiating state and a responding
state."); see also infra notes 108-43 and accompanying text.
'" See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 501-506. A court in the re-
sponding state that has personal jurisdiction over the obligor may "order income
withholding, determine the amount of arrearage and methods of payment, cite an
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filing a UIFSA action directly in State 2,105 with the help of
State 2's IV-D agency if requested;' or (4) administrative en-
forcement of the order by State 2's IV-D agency.
10 7
If W chooses the two-state enforcement procedure, she must
register the State 1 order in State 2 for enforcement.' In order
to register the State 1 order, W must contact either State 1's IV-
D agency" or a private attorney10° and complete the necessary
uncooperative party for civil or criminal contempt, set aside property for the satis-
faction of support, place liens, and order execution against the obligor's property."
Brunmmer, supra note 85, at 78; see also infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
"" See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 301(c) ("An individual
[petitioner] or a support enforcement agency may commence a proceeding author-
ized under this [Act] by filing a [petition] in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to a
responding tribunal or by filing a [petition] or a comparable pleading directly in a
tribunal of another state which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the
[respondent].").
,1 See id. § 307(a) ("A support enforcement agency of this State, upon request,
shall provide services to a [petitioner] in a proceeding under this [Act]."); Sampson,
supra note 12, at 107 n.28 (comparing procedure under URESA to UIFSA procedure
and stating that, under UIFSA, 'many petitioners may choose to have a local tribu-
nal and a particular governmental employee (or set of employees) who can respond
to inquiries about the progress in the case. That choice is left to the individual."); see
also supra note 28 (discussing assistance provided by IV-D agencies responsible for
child support enforcement activities).
107 (a) A party seeking to enforce a support order or an income-withholding
order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another state may send the docu-
ments required for registering the order to a support enforcement agency
of this State. (b) Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement
agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and,
if appropriate, use any administrative procedure authorized by the law of
this State to enforce a support order or an income-withholding order, or
both.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 507. UIFSA Section 507 "authorizes
summary enforcement of an interstate child support order through any administra-
tive means available for intrastate orders." Id. § 507 cmt.
10' See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 601, 602; see also id. § 601
cmt. ("Registration of that order in the responding state is the first step to enforce-
ment by a tribunal of that state.").
"9 See id. § 307(a). This Article does not attempt to evaluate either the effec-
tiveness or promptness of the state IV-D agencies, especially in light of budgetary
and staffing constraints. For example, in March 1996, Oklahoma's IV-D agency, the
Department of Human Services, handled approximately 4,000 UIFSA cases with a
staff of six agency employees specifically assigned to handle UIFSA cases, a per-
worker caseload of about 667 cases. Interview by Drew Houghton with Ronnie
Bates, President of the Oklahoma Child Support Association (March 1996); see also
Child Support Enforcement, 1994: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcomm. on
Federal Services, Postal Serv. and Civil Serv. of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (providing testimony of Nancy Ebb and statement of Pat
Addison). One commentator has argued that "[t]he two-state process under ...
UIFSA is obviously cumbersome, time-consuming, and totally dependent upon an
aggressive child support enforcement unit in the responding state." Brummer, supra
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
forms."' State 1 then becomes the "initiating state"' and the
State 1 court or other forum authorized to accept such filings is
the "initiating tribunal.""' The State 1 initiating tribunal then
forwards the documents". to the appropriate "responding tribu-
nal""6  or "support enforcement agency"" '6 in State 2, the
note 85, at 78. The drafters of RURESA noted in 1968 that some state officials were
not performing similar duties under URESA. REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL EN-
FORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 382 (1987); see also CLARK,
supra note 12, at 285 ("[URESA's] efficiency depends in large part upon the willing-
ness of the authorities in responding states to perform the obligations which the
statutes impose upon them.").
"0 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 309 ("An individual may em-
ploy private counsel to represent the individual in proceedings authorized by this
[Act]."); David H. Levy & Cecelia A. Haynes, Highlights of the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act, 83 ILL. B.J. 647, 648 (1995) (stating that private attorney can
apply to court to enforce order); Oliphant, supra note 84, at 1044 (asserting that
UIFSA section 309 "recognizes the right of a person to employ private counsel to
handle a dispute").
.. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 602(a) (listing documentation
that must be forwarded); see also id. § 311 (requiring verified pleading when peti-
tioner seeks to establish or modify support order or establish parentage). Courts ex-
pect strict compliance with the requirements of section 602(a). See Allen v. Allen,
No. A-95-1047, 1996 WL 547919 at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1996) (vacating regis-
tration of support order for failure to supply "a sworn statement by the party seek-
ing registration or a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the
amount of any arrearage" in accordance with UIFSA section 602(a)(3)).
'1 'Initiating state' means a state from which a proceeding is forwarded or
in which a proceeding is filed for forwarding to a responding state under
this [Act] or a law or procedure substantially similar to this [Act], the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the Revised Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101(7). The terms "initiating" and
"responding" state were retained from URESA. Id. prefatory note (amended 1996).
3 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101(8) (" 'Initiating tribunal'
means the authorized tribunal in an initiating state"). The drafters chose "tribunal"
rather than "court" in order to encompass administrative proceedings. Id. prefatory
note.
14 See id. § 304(a) (providing duties of issuing tribunal); id. § 602(a) (describing
procedures to register order for enforcement). One copy of the order to be registered
must be certified. Id. § 602(a)(2); see also Mathis v. State of Texas, 930 S.W.2d 203,
205-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). The initiation of the proceeding is a ministerial task
"rather than a matter of court adjudication or review." UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT prefatory note; id. § 304 cmt.; cf REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 14, 9B U.L.A. 450 (1988) (requiring initiating
state to determine whether petition states facts from which it may be determined
that respondent owes duty of support).
"5 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101(17) ("'Responding tribunal'
means the authorized tribunal in a responding state."). It appears that the
"responding tribunal" will be the same as the "registering tribunal." See id. § 101(15)
(defining "registering tribunal" as "tribunal in which a support order is registered").
16 Id. § 101(20); see Brumnmer, supra note 85, at 78 (explaining that petition and
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"responding state." 7 W's petition and the State 1 order are then
filed in the State 2 responding tribunal."'
Upon filing in State 2, the State 1 order is considered
"registered.""' Once this occurs, there is no defense to the regis-
tration per se of the State 1 order." The registered State 1 order
is "enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same
procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of' State 2, and
State 2 must enforce the registered order unless NCP prevails on
a permitted defense.' A government attorney in State 2 ap-
pears on W's behalf."2
document may be forwarded to support enforcement agency).
117 'Responding state' means a state in which a proceeding is filed or to
which a proceeding is forwarded for filing from an initiating state under
this [Act] or a law or procedure substantially similar to this [Act], the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the Revised Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101(16).
18 See id. § 305(a) (setting forth duties and powers of responding tribunal).
"9 Id. § 603(a) ("A support order or income-withholding order issued in another
state is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this State.").
In addition, "the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign
judgment ...." Id. § 602(b).
120 Cowan v. Moreno, 903 S.W.2d 119, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing ap-
peal for lack of jurisdiction since trial court order did not constitute final judgment
on damages) (citing UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 606 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt.
I, 307 (Supp. 1996)).
,2' See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 603(b) ("A registered order is-
sued in another state is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same
procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this State."). The drafters emphasized
that, unlike the result under URESA where the registered State 1 order became a
State 2 order, REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 40(a)
("Upon registration the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same
manner as a support order issued by a court of this State. It has the same effect and
is subject to the same procedures ... as a support order of this State ...."), under
UIFSA the State 1 order remains a State 1 order, enforced by State 2. UNIF. IN-
TERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 603 cmt.; Sampson, supra note 12, at 152 n.128
(discussing UIFSA provision that allows State 2 to register and enforce State I child
support order and noting that order remains order of State 1). The rules of evidence
and procedure of State 2 apply, but they are supplemented or superseded by UIFSA.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 603 cmt. The order, however, remains a
state order. Id. Case law confirms this analysis of the comment. See, e.g., Kelly v.
Otte, 474 S.E.2d 131, 134 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that law of forum state ap-
plies to foreign support orders), review denied, 479 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. 1996); Price v.
Price, 435 S.E.2d 652, 658-59 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding civil enforcement by State
2 valid).
'2 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 603(c) ("Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this article, a tribunal of this State shall recognize and enforce, but may not
modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.").See BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 228-30 (describing similar
process under URESA). UIFSA leaves unresolved the question of whether the gov-
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After registering the State 1 order, the State 2 tribunal must
notify H!NCP." The notice served must include several impor-
tant pieces of information, including the necessity of a request by
NCP for a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the
registered State 1 order within twenty days.'25 Should NCP re-
quest a hearing in State 2,126 he may assert only those defenses
enumerated in section 607,127 which mirror defenses typical to
ernment attorney represents W in an attorney-client relationship. See UNIF.
INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 307(c) ("'This [Act] does not create or negate a
relationship of attorney and client or other fiduciary relationship between a support
enforcement agency or the attorney for the agency and the individual being assisted
by the agency."). Additional state law, however, may answer that question. See Van-
zant v. Purvis, 927 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that under Arkan-
sas statute attorney for Arkansas Child Support Enforcement Unit does not repre-
sent obligee). See generally Paula Roberts, Attorney-Client Relationship and the IV-
D System: Protection Against Inadvertent Disclosure of Damaging Information, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 158 (1985) (asserting that while state attorneys represent
state agency and not AFDC mother as matter of law, exceptions to this rule make
certain information privileged).
See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 605(a). The notice must in-
clude a copy of the registered order and accompanying relevant documents. Id.
r2 Id. § 605(b)(2). If NCP does not request a hearing within twenty days of re-
ceipt of notice, he is precluded from "further contest of that order with respect to
any matter that could have been asserted." Id. § 605(b)(3); see also id. § 606(a)
(stating that non-registering party has twenty days to request hearing, vacate regis-
tration, assert defenses, or contest remedies sought). The official comment to UIFSA
section 606 notes that "[a] contest of the fundamental provisions of the registered
order is not permitted [in State 2]. [NCP] must return to the issuing state [State 1]
to prosecute such a contest (obviously only as the law of that state permits)." UNIF.
INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 606 cmt.
1216 Section 606(c) provides that if NCP requests a hearing, the State 2 tribunal
shall schedule one and give notice of the hearing to NCP, CP, and any state support
enforcement agency. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 606(c). UIFSA does
not place a time limit on the scheduling of the hearing, noting in the official com-
ment that "[alt present, federal regulations govern the allowable time frames for
contesting income withholding in IV-D cases. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b) (West 1991)."
The drafters of UIFSA cautioned that "[a]dditional, [sic] codification of the proce-
dure process is unwise." UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 606 cmt.
'2 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 606(a), 607. The defenses
enumerated in section 607(a) include: lack of personal jurisdiction over the contest-
ing party; fraudulently obtaining the order; modification, suspension or vacation of
the order; a stay of the order pending appeal by the issuing tribunal; a defense un-
der the laws of State 2 to the remedy sought; full or partial payment; and statutes of
limitation. See id. § 607(a). NCP has the burden of proving his defense. Id. NCP's
defenses are limited, however, because "[a] contest of the fundamental provisions of
the registered order is not permitted" in State 2. Id. § 606 cmt. Therefore, NCP
must return to State 1 to prosecute such a contest. Id.
NCP may not plead nonparentage as a defense if his parentage "has been previ-
ously determined by or pursuant to law," as would likely be the case if C was born
during CP and NCP's marriage. See id. § 315. But see Sampson, supra note 12, at
139 n.102 (discussing situations where child or next friend of child could subse-
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any judgment, such as lack of personal jurisdiction.18 CP need
not personally appear at the hearing contesting the validity or
enforcement of the support order in State 2 in order to testify in
support of the requested relief.129  If NCP does not request a
hearing within twenty days, or does not establish one of the
enumerated defenses to the order, the State 1 support order is
"confirmed."13  Confirmation of a registered support order in
State 2 "precludes further contest of the order with respect to
any matter that could have been asserted at the time of regis-
tration."31
quently bring suit attacking paternity). This statutory limitation implies that NCP
could plead nonparentage as a defense if the issue had not been previously deter-
mined. CP should not have obtained the original support order in State 1, however,
without a finding of NCP's parentage. See Villanueva v. Office of the Attorney Gen.,
935 S.W.2d 953, 956-57 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that Indiana court order re-
ferring to "child of the marriage" constituted paternity determination to be given
full faith and credit by Texas courts).
Although the permitted defenses to the validity or enforcement of a registered
order are "narrowly defined," UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 607 cmt., a
Texas appellate court permitted an obligor to challenge the registration and en-
forcement of a New Jersey judgment on the ground, inter alia, that two slightly dif-
ferent copies of the judgment had been filed. Mathis v. State, 930 S.W.2d 203, 205
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996). The Texas court ultimately rejected this defense, stating that
the certified judgment involved satisfied the authenticity requirements and that the
second judgment did not undermine the validity of the certified copy since both were
signed on the same day by the same judge. Id. at 207.
'2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 1, 2, 5, 11, 68, 70-73 (1982)
(describing typical defenses to judgments such as: lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of notice, fraud, mistake, duress, modifica-
tion, and incapacity); see also Gruber v. Wallner, 598 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Colo. 1979)
(refusing to recognize suspension of visitation rights as defense to support order);
Price v. Price, 435 S.E.2d 652, 657-58 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction is valid defense).
1'2 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 316(a). CP may use the special
evidence and discovery provisions for out-of-state participants. Subsections (b)
through (i) of section 316 detail these procedures. For example, an out of state party
is allowed to testify by telephone and transmit documents to the court by facsimile.
See id. § 316(f); see also supra notes 42-44.
'3' UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 606(b). Confirmation occurs either
by operation of law, when NCP does not request a hearing, id., or by order of the
registering tribunal if NCP requested a hearing but failed to "establish a defense ...
to the validity or enforcement of the order." Id. § 607(c). The tribunal "shall" order
NCP to pay costs and reasonable attorneys' fees if it determines that NCP requested
a hearing "primarily for delay." Id. § 313(c). A hearing is presumed to be requested
primarily for delay "if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced without
change." Id.
,3' UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 608; see also id. § 605 cmt.
("[Albsent a successful contest by the nonregistering party, the order will be con-
firmed and future contest will be precluded.").
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Once the support order is confirmed, the State 2 support
agency, or a private attorney if CP prefers, can request income
withholding, garnishment, or a lien on NCP's property."2 CP
may also move to have NCP held in contempt, initiate a criminal
prosecution, or pursue any other remedies available in State 2.133
If State 1 issues an income-withholding order garnishing
NCP's wages, then CP or anyone else 13 may simply send a copy
of the order to NCP's employer in State 2 without filing a UIFSA
proceeding and have NCP's employer withhold income.135 NCP's
employer must treat the income withholding order, if it appears
"regular on its face,"3 ' as though it had been issued by a State 2
court. 137 The employer must provide a copy of the order to NCP'38
132 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 305(b). For a description of
common enforcement remedies, see NANCY S. ERICKSON, CHILD SUPPORT MANUAL
FOR ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES 334-44 (1992); Calhoun, supra note 1, at 933-39.
Such remedies, however, are often ineffective. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 940-46
(describing failure of state to enforce adequately support orders and positing factors
which contribute to such failure).
"3 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 305(b).
3 Id. § 501 cmt.
13 See id. § 501 ("An income withholding order issued in another state may be
sent to ... obligor's employer ... without first filing a [petition] or comparable plead-
ing or registering the order with a tribunal of this State."); id. prefatory note ("[Tihe
support order may be sent directly to the obligor's employer in another state
(Section 501), which triggers wage withholding by that employer without the neces-
sity of a hearing unless the employee objects."); see Brummer, supra note 85, at 81
("The prudent approach [in this situation] would be to seek direct enforcement
through income withholding initially, and as soon as possible, register the order in
[State 2].").
116 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 502(b). The drafters intended a
liberal construction of this phrase. See id. § 502 cmt.; United States v. Morton, 467
U.S. 822, 828-29 (1984) (holding test for the term "regular on its face" contained in
42 U.S.C. § 659 (f) is met by simple examination of writ of garnishment); Sampson,
supra note 12, at 147 n.120. Federal law provides that "[a]n employer who complies
with an income withholding notice that is regular on its face shall not be subject to
civil liability to any individual or agency for conduct in compliance with the notice."
42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b)(6)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1996); see also UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 504 ("An employer who complies with an income-withholding order
issued in another state in accordance with this article is not subject to civil liability
to an individual or agency with regard to the employer's withholding of child sup-
port from the obligor's income.").
"3 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 501(b). If NCP resides in State
2 and his employer is served in State 3, the employer must treat the income with-
holding order as if it were issued by a State 3 court, and a hearing on NCP's objec-
tions, if any, must be held in State 3. Sampson, supra note 12, at 146-47, nn.118 &
121 (citing BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 151-52, 234).
18 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 502(a).
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and distribute the funds as the order directs.139 NCP, upon re-
ceiving notice, may then contest "the validity or enforcement" of
the order.14  The UIEFSA commentary'' and federal law, how-
ever, limit this contest to "mistake[s] of fact," including errors in
the amount of current support, accrued arrearages, or the obli-
gor's identity.
With respect to the child support portion' of the order in
Case 4(a), FFCCSOA appears to, and certainly was intended to,
reach the same result as UIFSA:45 State 2 must recognize and
enforce the State 1 support order.46 FFCCSOA mandates that
the "appropriate authorities of each State ... enforce according to
its terms a child support order made consistently with this sec-
tion by a court of another State."47 The phrase "consistently
with this section" is a term of art which requires that the issuing
court have "subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and
enter such an order," "personal jurisdiction over the contestants,"
and that the contestants received "reasonable notice and oppor-
139 See id. § 502(c).
141 Id. § 506(a). NCP must give notice to CP, any support enforcement agency
assisting CP, and each employer that has directly received an income withholding
order. Id. § 506(b). Section 604 choice of law provisions govern any such contest. Id.
§ 604. In the event of a contest, "the hearing is held in the state where the employer
[was] served." Sampson, supra note 12, at 147 n.121.
141 See UNIF. INTERsTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 506 cmt.
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(4)(A) (1994) (providing procedure to contest withhold-
ing based upon "mistake of fact").
'43 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 506 cmt. (quoting H.R. REP
No. 98-257 (1983)); see also Cowan v. Moreno, 903 S.W.2d 119, 123-24 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995) (reasoning that NCP's defense of incorrect calculation of arrearages related to
support order's enforceability). Grounds such as "inappropriateness of the amount of
support ordered to be paid, changed financial circumstances of the obligor, or lack of
visitation," therefore, are excluded and must be pursued in a non-UIFSA proceeding
in State 1. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 506 cmt. (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 98-527 (1983)); see also Chaisson v. Ragsdale, 914 S.W.2d 739, 741-42 (Ark.
1996) (noting that UIFSA goal of streamlining support enforcement proceedings
would be thwarted by joining collateral issues such as visitation).
'" FFCCSOA applies solely to child support and does not apply to alimony.
UIFSA applies to both child support and alimony.
"" See Margaret Campbell Haynes, Federal Full Faith and Credit For Child
Support Orders Act, 14 DEL. L. 26, 29 (1996) ("A second question is 'Does the
FFCCSOA significantly affect UIFSA states?' Again, the simple answer is 'No.' ").
Haynes notes, however, that there are several inconsistencies between FFCCSOA
and UIFSA that may lead to litigation. See id. (describing possible litigation issues
regarding interplay of multiple support orders and jurisdictional dilemma).
'4 See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text (discussing State 2's obliga-
tion to enforce registered order of State 1).
147 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(1) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
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tunity to be heard.""8 Since it is assumed that these require-
ments were met when State 1 issued the original support order,
State 2 must enforce the State 1 support order "according to its
terms. 149
Even in the simple case of enforcement of the State 1 sup-
port order in State 2, there is a potential inconsistency between
UIFSA and FFCCSOA. UIFSA appears to allow NCP to assert
more defenses in State 2, the responding state, than FFCCSOA
does. Under UIFSA, NCP may assert full or partial payment as
a defense to the registered support order in the responding
state.5 ' Under FFCCSOA, however, State 2 must "enforce ac-
cording to its terms" State l's order unless the State 1 court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the
parties, or the .parties did not receive adequate notice or an op-
portunity to be heard.' No other defense, including payment of
support, is specified in the federal law. A rigid interpretation of
FFCCSOA to prevent the assertion of defenses that are not enu-
merated would lead to absurd results. Section (h)(1) of
18 Id. § 1738B(c); see Bednarsh v. Bednarsh, 660 A.2d 575, 580-81 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) (holding that issue of whether possible fraud violated "reasonable
notice" requirement is to be decided by State 1 court). The requirements involving
the validity of the original child support orders mirror the well-established requi-
sites of a valid judgment, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (1982),
and the elements of federal procedural due process. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950) (requiring reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1946) (requiring requisite level of minimum contacts with forum state in order
for court to assert personal jurisdiction); see also Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228
(1945) ("A judgment obtained in violation of procedural due process is not entitled to
full faith and credit when sued upon in another jurisdiction.") (citing National Exch.
Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 270 (1904)). Thus, these defenses are already available
in any court without FFCCSOA's imprimatur.
149 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); see, e.g., State Dep't of Revenue
ex rel. Jorda v. Fleet, 679 So.2d 326, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that, ab-
sent narrow exceptions, FFCCSOA prohibits modification of State 1 child support
orders by State 2).
" UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 607(a)(6) (amended 1996); see
Altman v. Altman, 683 P.2d 62, 68 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that previous pay-
ments sufficient reason to contest and modify support order under URESA).
'5' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996). If NCP unsuccessfully raised
the defense of lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction in the State 1 issuing
court, NCP will be precluded from raising the same issue again in another state's
court. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 112 (1963) (subject matter jurisdiction);
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931) (personal
jurisdiction); see also Reynolds, supra note 10, at 427-29 (stating that Supreme
Court decided that litigation of subject matter jurisdiction objections in one court
may preclude relitigation in subsequent court).
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FFCCSOA, however, may provide a solution. This section states
that "[iln a proceeding to ... enforce a child support order, the fo-
rum State's law shall apply except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3). "152 The "forum State's law" includes UIFSA if that state
has enacted it, and consequently the defenses available under
UIFSA section 607 might still be asserted consistently with
FFCCSOA. In addition, the phrase "forum State's law" has been
held to include other defenses, including the statute of limita-
tions, which also may be asserted consistently with FFCCSOA.6 3
Case 4(b): What law applies to the enforcement action? As-
sume that the facts are the same as in Case 4(a), except that the
original State 1 support order required NCP to pay child support
until C reached the age of "majority." The age of majority in
State 1 is 19, while the age of majority in State 2 is 18. After
NCP moves to State 2, C turns 18 and NCP stopped paying child
support. CP files a UIFSA proceeding, forwarded to State 2, to
enforce the State 1 order until C reaches 19."5 Which state's law
governs the issue of whether C has reached the age of
"majority"?
In an enforcement proceeding, "[t]he law of the issuing state
governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current
payments and other obligations of support and the payment of
arrearages under the order."1 ' Therefore, State 2 should follow
State 1 law and enforce the support order until C reaches age 19,
152 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(h)(1) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
The exceptions enumerated in subsections (2) and (3) are not relevant to these hypo-
theticals.
10 See Kelly v. Otte, 474 S.E.2d 131, 136-37 (N.C. Ct. App.) (allowing obligor to
present statute of limitations defense after confirmation of registration of foreign
order), review denied, 479 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. 1996). Under UIFSA, which superseded
URESA in North Carolina, the Kelly court probably would have reached a different
result. The obligor's failure to interpose the statute of limitations as a defense prior
to confirmation of the registered order would preclude that defense. See UNIF.
INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 608; see also Comer v. Comer, 927 P.2d 265, 272
(Cal. 1996) (considering, but not deciding upon, NCP's argument that FFCCSOA re-
quires application of law of forum state which provided defense to arrearages based
upon CP's concealment of herself and her children).
's' For a similar fact pattern, see Gibson v. Baxter, 434 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989). Gibson involved an appeal from a decision applying State l's law regard-
ing the duration of a child support obligation under RURESA. Id. at 487. In affirm-
ing the trial court's ruling, the appellate court reasoned that RURESA was designed
to prevent forum shopping by obligors. Id. at 488; see also Gonzalez-Goenaga v.
Gonzalez, 426 So. 2d 1106, 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (applying State l's age of
majority).
'- UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 604(a).
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the age of majority in State 1.
The same result is reached under FFCCSOA section (h)(2).
It provides that, "[i]n interpreting a child support order includ-
ing the duration of current payments and other obligations of
support, a court shall apply the law of the State of the court that
issued the order."'56 The meaning of "majority" in the State 1
support order is a matter of "interpretation" affecting the
"duration of current payments" since payments will continue
longer under State l's law. Therefore, State l's law applies. 57
"6 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(h)(2) (West Supp. 1996). But see Marino v. Lurie, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 835, 841-42 (Ct. App. 1995) (modifying order of State 1 under law of State 2
since neither ex-spouse nor children resided in State 1); Haynes, supra note 145, at
28 & n.14 (asserting that Marino was wrongly decided since 'UIFSA and the
FFCCSOA include consistent choice of law rules"). Similarly, FFCCSOA requires
State 2 to apply the law of State 1 when interpreting an out-of-state child support
order, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(g)(2) (West Supp. 1996), but requires application of the
longest of the applicable states' statute of limitations when enforcing a child support
order. Id. § 1738B(g)(3) (emphasis added).
117 See Kelly, 474 S.E.2d at 134-36 (holding that under FFCCSOA North Caro-
lina trial court did not violate full faith and credit by voiding automatic escalation
clause in New Jersey divorce decree since neither child nor parents resided in New
Jersey). At least part of the trial court's order upheld in Kelly should have been re-
versed. CP registered the New Jersey order for child support, with its automatic es-
calation clause, for enforcement in North Carolina. Id. at 133. NCP received notice
of the registration, but did not contest the registration within 20 days, as required
by URESA. Id. at 135. Therefore, the order was confirmed. Id. Six months later,
NCP filed a motion to vacate the registration, in part on the ground that North
Carolina law invalidated the order's escalation clause. Id. at 133. The appellate
court affirmed the grant of NCP's motion and determined that, as of the date the
New Jersey order was registered in North Carolina, NCP's child support obligation
would be limited to the original amount without escalation. Id. at 135-36.
This decision appears to be erroneous on several grounds. First, the North
Carolina order retroactively modified approximately four months' worth of past-due
child support payments in violation of federal law. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(9) (West
1991 & Supp. 1996) (providing that "[plrocedures which require that any payment
or installment of support under any child support order ... [are] ... not subject to
retroactive modification by such State or by any other state"). Second, the court ap-
peared to address NCP's motion to vacate the registration as a motion to modify the
order. See Kelly, 474 S.E.2d at 136. Although FFCCSOA would permit the North
Carolina court to modify the New Jersey court's judgment, since all parties no
longer resided in New Jersey, it could be argued that the North Carolina legisla-
ture's voiding of escalation clauses comprised the only "changed circumstance" sup-
porting modification of the New Jersey order. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e)(2)(A)
(West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333); Altman v. Altman, 683 P.2d 62, 66-
67 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that under URESA State 2 may modify child sup-
port order if there exists "a showing of changed circumstances"). Elimination of the
escalation clause seems more like a hometown application of forum-state law than a
true modification based on changed circumstances. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e)
(West Supp. 1996); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 316(a), 9A U.L.A. 489-90
[Vol. 71:1
1997] UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT 37
Case 4(c): CP seeks modification of child support. Assume
that the facts remain identical to those in Case 4(a). Assume
further that CP follows UIFSA's two-state enforcement proce-
dure, but CP also seeks an increase in the amount of child sup-
port in the proceeding forwarded to State 2. CP and C continue
to reside in State 1. Can the State 2 court require such an in-
crease in NCP's child support obligation?
The answer is "no" under both UIFSA and FFCCSOA unless
CP and NCP consent in writing to State 2's jurisdiction to modify
the support order.' Absent such consent, however, State 2 may
only modify State l's support order if the elements of UIFSA
section 611(a)(1) are satisfied."9 Since CP and C reside in
(1973) ("[Tlhe provisions of any decree respecting ... support may be modified only
as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon
a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the
terms unconscionable."). The application of North Carolina law, therefore, arguably
violated at least the spirit of FFCCSOA's choice-of-law provision, which requires
application of the law of the issuing state in "interpreting a child support order." 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738B(h)(2).
The Kelly court, however, did possess the requisite judicial power to modify the
New Jersey court's order, prospectively at least. FFCCSOA explicitly states that
State 2 may modify State l's child support order if State 1 is no longer the child's
state of residence or the residence of any contestant. See 28 U.S.C.A. §
1738B(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996); see supra note 154; see also Thompson v.
Thompson, 645 S.W.2d 79, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (noting ability of State 2 to modify
order of State 1 court under URESA where all parties to action resided in State 2 at
time of requested modification).
"" See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e) (West Supp. 1996); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 611(a)(2). After such an order is signed, an individual party or the
child is subject to personal jurisdiction in State 2 and State 2 may modify the order
and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT AT § 611(d). An agreement signed by the parties must be initiated and
confirmed by the State 1 court and State 1 files a copy of the agreement. Id. § 611
cmt.159 UIFSA section 611(a) provides:
After a child-support order issued in another state has been registered in
this State, the responding tribunal of this State may modify that order only
if Section 613 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds that:
(1) the following requirements are met:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside
in the issuing state;
(ii) a [petitioner] who is a nonresident of this State seeks modifi-
cation; and
(iii) the [respondent] is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
tribunal of this State; or
(2) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the tribunal of this State and all of the parties who are
individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal for a
tribunal of this State to modify the support order and assume continu-
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State 1, the "issuing state,"'60 the first required element, that
neither the child nor the parents reside in the issuing state, is
not satisfied. Thus, State 1 remains the state of continuing, ex-
clusive jurisdiction and only State 1 may modify the child sup-
port order. 6'
CP must therefore seek modification of the order in her own
state, State 1, and then forward the modified order to State 2 for
enforcement. While it usually would be more convenient for CP
to seek the modification in her own state, she may prefer to seek
the modification in NCP's state, State 2. In Case 4(c), since CP
is already forwarding a UIFSA proceeding to State 2 for en-
forcement, she may wish to consent to State 2's jurisdiction to
modify.'62 Such a decision, however, should be made thoughtfully
because State 2 becomes the state of continuing, exclusive juris-
diction after modifying the order. CP would then be prevented
from moving to modify the support order further in her own state
without NCP's consent.1
63
The same result is reached under FFCCSOA. Absent the
parties' consent, the State 2 court cannot modify the State 1
child support order."M Generally, FFCCSOA prohibits a state
from modifying another state's child support order unless the re-
quirements of subsections (e), (f), and (i) are met.'65 Since
ing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the issuing state
is a foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or established pro-
cedures substantially similar to the procedures under this [Act], the
consent otherwise required of an individual residing in this State is
not required for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to modify the
child-support order.
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611(a). New section 613 does not apply to
Case 4(c); it applies only where the parties have left the issuing state and moved to
the same new state, which is the forum state.
160 Id. § 101(9) (" 'Issuing state' means the state in which a tribunal issues a
support order or renders a judgment determining parentage.").
161 See id. § 205(a)-(c); Haynes, supra note 145, at 28 (defining continuing, ex-
clusive jurisdiction).
162 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 205(a)(2), 611(a)(2).
161 Id. § 611(d) ("On issuance of an order modifying a child-support order issued
in another state, a tribunal of this State becomes the tribunal of continuing, exclu-
sive jurisdiction.").
16 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e)(2)(B) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-
333). Each contestant must provide written consent to the court that will modify the
order and the modifying court assumes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
order. Id.
'61 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996). Subsection (e) provides:
A court of a State may make a modification of a child support order with
respect to a child that is made by a court of another State if-
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State 1 remains the "child's State"16 and "the residence of' CP,
State 2 cannot modify State 1's child support order without the
requisite consent.
If a state has not yet adopted UIFSA, FFCCSOA will pre-
empt URESA on this point. URESA encourages a responding
state to enter a new support order that "does not nullify" the old
support order,167 and to modify a registered foreign support order
on the theory that it "shall be treated in the same manner as a
support order issued by a court" of the responding state.68 Since
the provisions of URESA concerning modification of support or-
ders directly conflict with the provisions of FFCCSOA that pro-
hibit a responding state from modifying a prior child support or-
(1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child support order; and
(2)(A) the court of the other State no longer has continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction of the child support order because that State no longer is
the child's State or the residence of any contestant; or
(B) each contestant has filed written consent to that court's making
the modification and assuming continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
the order.
Id. § 1738B(e). The statute defines "contestant" as "a person ... who claims a right to
receive child support; is a party to a proceeding that may result in the issuance of a
child support order, or is under a child support order." Id. § 1738B(b).
"'; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(b) (West Supp. 1996) (" 'Child's State' means the State
in which a child resides.").
167 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 31, 9B
U.L.A. 531 (1987) ("A support order made by a court of this State pursuant to this
Act does not nullify and is not nullified by ... a support order made by a court of any
other state pursuant to a substantially similar act or any other law, regardless of
priority of issuance, unless otherwise specifically provided by the court .... "); UNIF.
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 30, 9B U.L.A. 600 (1987) ("No order
of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a responding state shall su-
persede any other order of support ....").
168 UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 38 ("The support order
as confirmed shall have the same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered
in the court of this state"); REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
ACT § 40(a) ("Upon registration the registered foreign support order shall be treated
in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this State."). The Uni-
form Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA"), adopted in 46 states and
territories, 13 U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 1996), contains a similar provision. Section 2 of
UEFJA provides that upon registration of a foreign judgment in another state, the
latter state "shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of
the [court] of this state." Id. § 2, 13 U.L.A. 154 (1986). Under this provision, courts
have allowed modification of a decree for alimony and child support in the state of
registration as well as the state of issuance. See Worthley v. Worthley, 283 P.2d 19,
24 (Cal. 1955) (explaining that to hold otherwise would result in unreasonable out-
come); Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1251 (Wyo. 1976) (asserting that forum
state possesses modification jurisdiction concurrent with issuing state). FFCCSOA
preempts UEFJA to the extent that UEFJA permits this modification of child sup-
port orders. See infra note 170.
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der unless certain conditions are satisfied,6 ' the URESA provi-
sions are preempted by the federal statute.70
A recent New York case, Cross v. Mastowski,"' presents an
interesting variant of this fact pattern, and may have been
wrongly decided under FFCCSOAY2 Prior to divorcing F, M ob-
tained a New York court order requiring F to pay $50 per month
in child support through the New York equivalent of a URESA
proceeding.'73 At the time that M filed her URESA petition, she
lived in Florida.'74 M subsequently obtained a default divorce in
Florida which included an order requiring F to pay $70 per week
in child support.'75 After registering the Florida order in New
York, M sought to enforce arrearages under the Florida order,
even though F had paid all amounts due under the New York or-
der. The New York court held that the Florida order had
"supersede[d]" the New York order. 76 Furthermore, the court
held that "FFCCSOA does not apply to pre-existing [UJRESA] or-
ders which are neither granted under the continuing jurisdiction
contemplated by [FFCCSOA] nor meant to be the final adjudica-
"9 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996). The statute allows modifi-
cation of a child support order if the court has jurisdiction to issue such an order
and "the court of the [issuing] State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
of the child support order ...." Id. § 1738B(e)(2)(A).
170 See, e.g., Kelly v. Otte, 474 S.E.2d 131, 134 (N.C. Ct. App.) (stating that Su-
premacy Clause requires FFCCSOA to be "binding on all states and supersede any
inconsistent provision of state law, including any inconsistent provisions of uniform
state laws such as URESA"), review denied, 1996 WL 762108 (N.C. Dec. 5, 1996);
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)
(stating that even if Congress has not entirely assumed regulation of field, "state
law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is,
when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress") (citations omitted); Haynes, supra note 145, at 28-29 (concluding that
"it is, at a minimum, contrary to the stated purpose of the FFCCSOA for a URESA
state to issue an order in a different amount when there is an existing support order
that the obligee is trying to enforce").
' 650 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Fain. Ct. 1996).
1 New York has not yet adopted UIFSA. See supra note 26 (listing states that
have adopted UIFSA).
173 Cross, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
" Id. The opinion does not clarify whether M ever resided in New York.
115 Id. The opinion does not explicitly state the basis utilized by the Florida court
to assert personal jurisdiction over F. If Florida did not have personal jurisdiction
over F, the court's judgment of child support would have been void, although the di-
vorce decree would be valid if M met Florida's domiciliary requirement. See supra
notes 36, 44, 50-52 and accompanying text.
176 Cross, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
[Vol. 71:1
19971 UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORTACT 41
tion of the child support rights of the parties or their children."177
The latter part of this holding-that FFCCSOA only applies
to "final adjudication[s]"-is clearly wrong. A "child support or-
der" subject to FFCCSOA includes an "order of a court requiring
the payment of child support in periodic amounts ... and ... in-
cludes (i) a ... temporary order; and (ii) an initial order
FFCCSOA, therefore, may apply to orders that are not intended
to be the final adjudication between the parties. The remainder
of the holding is wrong if New York had personal jurisdiction
over M when the New York court ordered F to pay $50 per
month. If New York had personal jurisdiction over M, then the
New York "child support order" was "made consistently with"
section (c) of FFCCSOA.179 Thus, the Florida court should have
enforced the order "according to its terms" 0 because the court
did not have jurisdiction to modify the support order while F
continued to reside in New York. 81
Case 4(d): CP seeks modification of alimony in State 2. As-
sume the same facts as in Case 4(c), except that CP also seeks an
increase in alimony in the UIFSA proceeding forwarded to
State 2. Can the State 2 court order such an increase in NCP's
alimony obligation?
Under UIFSA, State 2 cannot order an increase in NCP's
alimony obligation. UIFSA provides that the court issuing a
spousal support order "has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
[the] spousal support order throughout the existence of the sup-
port obligation."8" Thus, only the issuing court has jurisdiction
under UIFSA to modify a spousal support order. 1" This restric-
7 Id. at 513 n.1.
178 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(b) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333)
(emphasis added); cf. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(e) (amended
1996) ("A temporary order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional
conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.").
1- 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that order is made con-
sistent with section when court possesses both subject matter and personal juris-
diction). It is apparent from the opinion in Cross that all other requirements of
FFCCSOA section (c) were met.
'8" 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); see State ex rel. Skladanuk v.
Skladanuk, 683 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that FFCCSOA
deprived Florida court of jurisdiction to modify New York child support order when
both mother and child reside in New York).
... 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
82 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(f).
M Id. ("A tribunal of this State may not modify a spousal-support order issued
by a tribunal of another state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that or-
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tion upon the power to modify spousal support orders is another
change from URESA; URESA could be construed to allow modifi-
cation by a state other than the issuing state.'
Although UIFSA enables the parties to consent to child sup-
port modification jurisdiction,185 the statute does not contain a
"parties' consent" exception to the rule prohibiting modification
of alimony by a court other than the issuing court.'86 Thus, in
Case 4(d), even if W wanted to consent to State 2's modification
of the spousal support order, UIFSA would appear to prevent W
from consenting.87 If W seeks modification of both child support
der under the law of that state."); see also id. § 611 (allowing modification by an-
other state only for "child support orders"). The court issuing the spousal support
order must have subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the par-
ties and the parties must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard.
"4 See id. § 205 cmt. (stating that UIFSA effects "radical" departure from
URESA, but "[i]nterstate modification of pure spousal support was relatively rare
under RURESA"); REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 31,
9B U.L.A. 531 (1987); id. § 40(a), 9B U.L.A. 546 (1987); UNIF. RECIPROCAL EN-
FORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 30, 9B U.L.A. 600 (1987); id. § 38, 9B U.L.A. 606
(1987); see also Mullis v. Mullis, 669 P.2d 763, 764-65 (Okla. 1983) (allowing modifi-
cation of future obligations where State 2 court finds that modification is justified);
Commonwealth ex rel. Byrne v. Byrne, 243 A.2d 196, 197 (Pa. Super. 1968)
(acknowledging that courts in responding states have power to modify judgments
under URESA); Koehler v. Koehler, 559 S.W.2d 944, 949 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)
(noting that states have "right to modify decrees in domestic relations matters");
Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 618 P.2d 528, 530 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that "liberal
interpretation of URESA" allows responding state to decide "amount of support
properly due a person").
1"5 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 205(a)(2), 611(a)(2).
186 See id. § 205(f).
187 If UIFSA section 205(f) is construed as a limitation on subject matter juris-
diction, then the parties may not be able to confer jurisdiction upon a court merely
by consenting to the court's exercise of jurisdiction. See Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ("Neither party has questioned [federal subject
matter jurisdiction], but it is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction of
the circuit court, which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded. This duty
we have frequently performed of our own motion."). But see BRILMAYER, supra note
10, at 44 ("The parties to a state court lawsuit can waive objections to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, either by agreeing to the forum in advance of the litigation or by
failing to object to jurisdiction after litigation commences.") (emphasis added); Dan
B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction By Consent, 40 N.C. L. REV. 49 (1961)
(questioning rule preventing waivers of subject matter jurisdiction defects by con-
sent). If section 205(f) is construed as a party-protection provision rather than a
limitation on subject matter jurisdiction, courts may allow parties to waive such
protection and consent to alimony modification jurisdiction. For example, a party
may consent to a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, even if the court would not
otherwise have been able to exercise constitutionally such jurisdiction. See Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
(1982) ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an
individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived."); see also UNIF. IN-
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and spousal support, there is good reason for W not to consent to
State 2's jurisdiction to modify the child support order. If W did
consent to State 2's jurisdiction to modify, she would have to
prosecute two actions, one for child support modification in
State 2 and another for alimony modification in State 1.'m
FFCCSOA does not apply to spousal support orders. More-
over, some states still operate under URESA, which may allow
modification of a spousal support order by a court other than the
issuing court. 8' Thus, if W seeks modification of both spousal
support and child support in a state that has not adopted
UIFSA, W might simultaneously be prevented from modifying
the child support order by FFCCSOA and encouraged by URESA
to modify the spousal support order. Hopefully, the State 2 court
would decline to bifurcate interrelated financial issues.1 90
Case 4(e): NCP seeks modification in State 2. Assume the
same facts as in Case 4(a), but, in response to the UIFSA peti-
tion forwarded to State 2 for enforcement, H/NCP claims that he
has lost his job. H/NCP then moves to reduce his child support
and alimony payments. Can State 2 take jurisdiction of his
modification petition?
In Cases 4(c) and (d), W/CP unsuccessfully sought an in-
crease in support payments in State 2. This time H/NCP seeks a
decrease in support payments in State 2. The result here is the
same as in Cases 4(c) and (d). Under UIFSA, State 2 does not
have jurisdiction to modify either the child support order, absent
the parties' consent,' or the spousal support order. 92 State 2
also does not have jurisdiction to modify the child support order
under FFCCSOA, which preempts URESA to the extent that
URESA would dictate a contrary result. 9'
TERSTATE FAMIuLY SUPPORT ACT § 201(2).
' See infra Part lI(B)(1) and Appendix (proposing amendment to broaden par-
ties' ability to consent to modification jurisdiction).
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
Due to Congress' recent mandate that states adopt UIFSA by January 1,
1988, see supra note 7, URESA-related problems should gradually be obviated.
" Since W/CP and C continue to reside in State 1, State I has continuing, ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the child support order and State 2 cannot modify the order
absent the parties' written consent. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text
(discussing requirements for effective consent agreement).
'92 Only State 1, the issuing state, may modify the spousal support order. See
supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
'9' See State ex rel. Skladanuk v. Skladanuk, 683 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (denying motion to decrease child support order while mother and child
continued to reside in issuing state); State ex rel. Jorda v. Fleet, 679 So. 2d 326, 329
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Proceeding with the modification litigation in State 1 may
create a significant difference in the relative inconvenience to the
parties. While W/CP lives in State 1, HINCP resides in State 2
and a modification proceeding in State 1 will be significantly
more inconvenient for him. The fact that H/NCP voluntarily
moved to State 2, thereby causing his own inconvenience, does
not provide a satisfactory justification. People move for many
reasons, some of which may be outside of their control. In addi-
tion, H/NCP may have good reason for the requested modifica-
tion. For example, HINCP may have lost his job and has been
unable to secure another. Alternatively, W may have remarried
which, according to the terms of the order, terminates H/NCP's
alimony obligation.
Under these circumstances H/NCP may avail himself of
UIFSA's two-state procedure. HJNCP may initiate a UIFSA pro-
ceeding in State 2 which is forwarded to State 1 for modification
without HINCP having to appear or hire a lawyer in State .'
NCP may request the services of State l's support enforcement
agency,'95 and the special interstate evidence and discovery rules
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (granting writ of prohibition against Florida court modify-
ing Georgia order when CP and C maintained residence in Georgia); Wilkie v. Silva,
685 A.2d 1239, 1240 (N.H. 1996) (holding that FFCCSOA prohibited modification of
support order); Isabel M. v. Thomas M., 624 N.Y.S.2d 356, 359-60 (Farn. Ct. 1995)
(concluding that FFCCSOA's preemption of USDL warranted denial of motion to
modify support order issued in Pennsylvania); Paton v. Brill, 663 N.E.2d 421, 424-25
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that FFCCSOA explicitly prohibits modifications).
'94 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 206(b) (amended 1996) ("A tri-
bunal of this State having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support order
may act as a responding tribunal to enforce or modify the order.") (emphasis added);
see also id. prefatory note ("Spousal support is modifiable in the interstate context
under UIFSA only when such a request is forwarded to the original issuing state
from an initiating state."); id. § 205 cmt. ("Under UIFSA, modification of spousal
support is limited to a procedure whereby an action is initiated outside of the issu-
ing state and a tribunal in that original state modifies its order under its law."); id. §
611 cmt. (stating that subsection 611(a)(1) "contemplate[s] that the issuing state has
lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and that the obligee may seek modification in
the obligor's state of residence, or that the obligor may seek a modification in the
obligee's state of residence"); Sampson, supra note 12, at 120 n.65 ("[Ihf the support
order is to be relitigated in the context of a motion to modify, the burden is on the
party who moved to return to the state of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction whether
that individual is the obligor or the obligee."); see also Sampson, supra, at 155 n.138
("[Ilt is at least theoretically possible that the obligor would seek to register an or-
der, either in his own state or in the state in which the obligee resides.").
195 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 307(a); id. § 307 cmt. (noting
that "either the obligee or the obligor [may] request services"); Sampson, supra note
12, at 134 n.96 (explaining that official comment to section 307 changes outdated
presumption that "mother-obligee" is only partly entitled to state-subsidized legal
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would apply.
19 6
Case 4(): What law applies to NCP's requested modification
in State 1? Assume the same facts as in Case 4(a). Assume fur-
ther that NCP files a motion directly in State 1 claiming he has
lost his job and seeking to reduce his child support payments.
Assume that State 2's law is more lenient than State l's in ac-
counting for an obligor's temporary decrease in income. NCP ar-
gues that State 1 should apply State 2 law to his modification
petition since he is a citizen of State 2. Which state's law should
State 1 apply to the modification proceeding?
Neither UIFSA nor FFCCSOA provide the answer because
this is no longer a two-state proceeding.'97 NCP filed his petition
directly in State 1, the issuing state. Thus, State l's general
conflicts-of-law principles would apply. Since the order was
originally issued by a State 1 court, which has continuing juris-
diction, State 1 will continue to apply its own law.9
Case 5. Divorce in State 1, CP and C move to State 2
Case 5(a): CP seeks enforcement in State 2. Assume that H
and W were divorced in State 1 and the court ordered H to pay
child support and spousal support. W/CP and C move to State 2.
HINCP remains in State 1 and discontinues all support pay-
ments. Can CP file a UIFSA enforcement action in State 2, even
though there is no personal jurisdiction over NCP?
Yes; this case is the reverse of Case 4(a). W/CP could file a
two-state enforcement proceeding in State 2, as described in re-
verse for Case 4(a).'99 State 2 does not actually exercise personal
assistance).
See supra note 43.
" Cf UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 202 (providing that when
"tribunal of this State [exercises] personal jurisdiction over a nonresident under
Section 201 ... Articles 3 through 7 do not apply and the tribunal shall apply the
procedural and substantive law of this State, including the rules on choice of law
other than those established by this [Act]").
'93 Even if UIFSA or FFCCSOA applied to Case 4(f), the answer would probably
remain the same. State 1 law will still govern the modification petition. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738B(h) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333) ("In a proceed-
ing to ... modify ... a child support order, the forum State's law shall apply except as
provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) .... "); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §
202 ("A tribunal of this State exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent under Section 201 ... shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this
State, including the rules on choice of law other than those established by this
[Act].").
' See supra notes 108-33 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over HINCP, but forwards the proceeding to State 1
for enforcement."'
Case 5(b): CP seeks modification in State 2. Assume the
same facts as in Case 5(a), except that W/CP files a petition in
State 2 to register and modify the State 1 order by increasing the
child and spousal support obligations. Can State 2 modify the
State 1 order?
The answer is no. The analysis is identical to Cases 4(c) and
4(d).20' State 1 retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
child support order because HINCP still resides there.2  Under
UIFSA section 611(a), a state other than State 1 cannot modify
the child support order unless the parties agree.2" FFCCSOA
dictates the same result with respect to the child support or-
der.204
W/CP's request to modify the spousal support order presents
a slightly different problem. Under UIFSA, State 1 has continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction for the life of the support obligation
and no other state may modify the spousal support order.0 5 In
this case, CP, the obligee, is the inconvenienced party. UIFSA
200 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 206(a) ("A tribunal of this
State [State 2] may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another
state to enforce or modify a support order issued in that state."); id. § 206(b) ("A tri-
bunal of this State [State 1] having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support
order may act as a responding tribunal to enforce or modify the order.").
21 See supra notes 158-90 and accompanying text.
202 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(a)(1); see also id. § 205(d)
("A tribunal of this State shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a
tribunal of another state which has issued a child-support order pursuant to this
[Act] or a law substantially similar to this [Act].").
203 See Link v. Alvarado, 929 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that
Texas' adoption of UIFSA prevents modification of issuing state's child support or-
der); Thompson v. Thompson, 893 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (same); cf.
Deltoro v. McMullen, 471 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing modifi-
cation of child support order by State 2 under URESA, but recognizing that UIFSA
would prevent modification).
204 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(d) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333)
("A court of a State that has made a child support order consistently with this sec-
tion has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order if the State is the child's
State or the residence of any individual contestant unless the court of another State,
acting in accordance with subsections (e) and (f) has made a modification of the or-
der."); Harbour v. Harbour, 677 So. 2d 700, 702-03 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Schuyler v.
Ashcraft, 680 A.2d 765, 780-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). FFCCSOA pre-
empts URESA and UEFJA to the extent that those acts would permit State 2 to
modify the State 1 order. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
205 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(f); supra notes 181-83 and
accompanying text.
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anticipates that CP may use the two-state procedure of filing a
petition for modification in State 2 to be forwarded to State 1.206
A recent case following this fact pattern, however, illustrates
the full extent of possible inconvenience to CP despite the ability
to utilize the two-state procedure if custody as well as support
issues are involved. In Schuyler v. Ashcraft, °7 the parties di-
vorced in Florida and CP and C moved to New Jersey. NCP at-
tempted to gain custody of C through repeated successful ex
parte applications to Florida courts, stalked CP, threatened her
with murder and kidnapping, and even fraudulently obtained a
Florida order to extradite her. The New Jersey Superior Court
held that it had sole subject matter jurisdiction under both the
UCCJA and PKPA to modify and restrict NCP's visitation
rights."' 8 The court then held, however, that under FFCCSOA it
lacked authority to modify the support provisions of the Florida
order since NCP still resided in Florida."9 Accordingly, the New
Jersey court relegated CP to filing a two-state URESA2 1° proceed-
ing in New Jersey to be forwarded to Florida.211
Schulyer illustrates that UIFSA's and FFCCSOA's rule of
continuing exclusive jurisdiction over child support when the
noncustodial parent resides in the issuing state,212 combined with
UCCJA and PKPA's rule granting jurisdiction over custody is-
sues to the child's "home State," 3 can create an unfortunate bi-
furcation of custody and support issues-the precise dilemma
21 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text. W/CP may also file a modifi-
cation petition directly in State 1 and this modification petition would not constitute
a proceeding governed by UIFSA.
207 680 A.2d 765, 780-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
2 ' Id. at 773-80.
209 Id. at 780-81. The court also held that it lacked "subject matter jurisdiction"
to enforce the Florida support order. Id. at 781 (emphasis added). This holding is
contrary to section (a)(1) of FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996),
and inconsistent with the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over NCP by rea-
son of his appearance in New Jersey. Schulyer, 680 A.2d at 780.210 New Jersey has not yet adopted UIFSA. See supra note 27.
211 Schulyer, 680 A.2d at 780-89. This ruling is particularly disturbing since
NCP had successfully obtained numerous ex parte orders in Florida based on
fraudulent representations to different Florida judges. See id. at 770-72. The New
Jersey court, however, correctly interpreted FFCCSOA and concluded that it did not
have jurisdiction to modify the child support order.
212 See 28 U.S.C-A. § 1738B(d) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333);
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAmLY SUPPORT ACT § 205(a)(1) (amended 1996).
213 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1994); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
ACT § 5, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 145 (1988).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that UIFSA's drafters hoped to avoid.214 Of course, NCP could
consent to State 2's jurisdiction to modify the child support or-
der.215 In a case like Schuyler, however, where NCP seemed to
win in Florida and lose in New Jersey, NCP's consent to New
Jersey's jurisdiction is unlikely.
Case 6. Divorce in State 1, CP and C move to State 2, NCP
moves to State 3.
Case 6(a): CP seeks enforcement. H and W reside in State 1
during the marriage and are divorced in State 1, where W/CP is
awarded alimony and child support for C. W/CP and C move to
State 2 and HiNCP moves to State 3. H/NCP stops making all
support payments. How can W/CP enforce the State 1 order
from her home state, State 2?
The registration and enforcement process in this three-state
hypothetical is essentially the same as the one described in Case
4(a) for a two-state hypothetical. 16 CP initiates a UIFSA pro-
ceeding in her home state, State 2, the "initiating state."217
State 2 forwards the necessary documents, including the State 1
order, to State 3, the "responding state" where NCP resides, for
registration and enforcement in State 3.218
Case 6(b): NCP seeks modification of alimony in the State 3
UIFSA proceeding. Assume the same facts as in Case 6(a) except
that, in responding to the UIFSA proceeding in State 3, NCP
moves to terminate the alimony payments on the ground that CP
has remarried. Can the State 3 court terminate the alimony?
As in Cases 4(d), 4(e) and 5(b), the answer is no. UIFSA
provides that the jurisdiction of the issuing court over a spousal
support order continues throughout the life of the obligation and
no other state may modify the award.219 Both parties are some-
what inconvenienced by having to litigate the modification of
214 See Denelis, supra note 34, at 1353 (discussing burdens to litigants caused by
bifurcated proceedings); supra note 85 and accompanying text.
215 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1996); UNIF. INTERSTATE
FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(a)(2).
216 See supra notes 108-33 and accompanying text (substituting "State 3" for
Case 6(a) in place of "State 2" as described in Case 4(a)).
217 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §101(7). CP may either employ
the services of State 2's IV-D agency, id. § 307, or hire a private attorney. Id. § 309.
218 See supra notes 111-31 and accompanying text.
29 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(f). FFCCSOA does not apply
to actions concerning spousal support orders.
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spousal support in State 1, a state in which neither party cur-
rently resides. UIFSA does not appear to allow the parties to
stipulate to the jurisdiction of a state other than State 1 to mod-
ify spousal support.' 0 NCP could, however, institute a UIFSA
action in State 3 that is forwarded to State 1 for modification of
the alimony award."1
Case 6(c): The extent of State l's continuing, exclusive juris-
diction over the spousal support order. Assume the same facts as
in Case 6(a) except that H files a UIFSA proceeding in State 3 to
be forwarded to State 1, seeking termination of alimony on the
ground that W has remarried. Since the parties are properly be-
fore the State 1 court on the issue of alimony modification, can H
or W request that the State 1 court modify the child support ob-
ligation in the same proceeding?
This seemingly straightforward hypothetical generates a
somewhat complicated analysis. To illustrate its potential diffi-
culties, contrast Case 6(c)'s hypothetical of a two-state UIFSA
proceeding with another probable scenario: direct filing of a mo-
tion for modification in State 1. When the petitioner avoids the
UIFSA two-state procedure and files an action directly in State 1
for modification of child support, UIFSA! 2 and FFCCSOA
probably do not apply. Before the advent of UIFSA and
FFCCSOA, the direct filing of a petition for modification of child
support in State 1 would generally have been considered a con-
tinuation of the original divorce action. State 1 would therefore
have both personal jurisdiction over the parties, even if they
have moved out of state,2" and subject matter jurisdiction to
220 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
22 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 206(a)-(b); supra notes 194-96
and accompanying text.
'2A tribunal of this State exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent under Section 201 may apply Section 316 (Special Rules of Evidence
and Procedure) to receive evidence from another state, and Section 318
(Assistance with Discovery) to obtain discovery through a tribunal of an-
other state. In all other respects, Articles 3 through 7 do not apply ....
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 202 (emphasis added).
m See Porter v. Porter, 684 A.2d 259, 262 (R.I. 1996) ("Because the instant case
involves a Rhode Island state court enforcing its own order that has not been modi-
fied by another state, [FFCCSOA] does not control.").
See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (1913) ("[I]f a judicial pro-
ceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the party concerned it is within
the power of a State to bind him by every subsequent order in the cause .... "); Elldns
v. Elkins, 299 F. 690, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (asserting that jurisdiction continues as
long as necessary to make court's decree effective); Massimino v. Massimino, 162
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
modify.225 If UIFSA applies and is construed to prevent State 1
from modifying its own order even with a direct filing in State 1
(and assuming there is no motion to modify properly pending in
another state), that is a major change from preexisting law that
went unremarked upon by the official UIFSA commentators. It
is unlikely, therefore, that UIFSA and FFCCSOA apply to the
direct filing of a modification motion in the issuing state when no
other state has exercised jurisdiction to modify and State 1 could
properly assume jurisdiction to modify both the alimony and the
child support orders.
Case 6(c), however, does not postulate a direct filing in
State 1. This case concerns a UIFSA two-state proceeding initi-
ated in either State 2 or State 3 which is forwarded to State 1 for
modification. Since UIFSA now applies, the result may be dif-
ferent than if parties had filed directly in State 1.
Under both UIFSA and FFCCSOA, State 1 appears to have
lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the child support or-
der when CP, C, and NCP all moved out of State 1.6 The fact
N.Y.S.2d 646, 649 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (authorizing court to annul, vary, or modify di-
vorce judgment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 26 (1989) ("If a
state obtains judicial jurisdiction over a party to an action, the jurisdiction continues
throughout all subsequent proceedings which arise out of the original cause of ac-
tion. Reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard must be given the
party at each new step in the proceeding."); id. § 26 cmt b ("Even without the con-
tinued existence of some jurisdictional basis, a state retains judicial jurisdiction to
render judgment ... on the original cause of action."); E.H. Schloper, Annotation,
Necessity of Personal Service Within State Upon Nonresident Spouse as Prerequisite
of Court's Power to Modify Its Decree as to Alimony or Child Support in Matrimonial
Action, 62 A.L.R.2d 544, 546 (1958).
See, e.g., Porter, 684 A.2d at 260 (holding that parties' absence from state for
four years did not impair State l's jurisdiction); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 148 S.E.2d
771, 774 (Va. 1966) (holding jurisdiction over husband unimpaired after husband
departed from issuing state); Commonwealth ex rel. Kenitzer v. Richter, 475 S.E.2d
817, 820 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Sheffield, 148 S.E.2d at 774) (holding that State
1 possessed jurisdiction over father despite his departure from state); CLARK, supra
note 12, at 725-26 & nn.21-24.
22 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(d) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333);
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(a)(1); id. § 611 cmt. ("Once every in-
dividual party and the child leave the issuing state, the continuing, exclusive juris-
diction of the issuing tribunal to modify its order terminates, although its order re-
mains in effect and enforceable until it is modified by another tribunal with
authority to do so under the Act."); Kelly v. Otte, 474 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. Ct. App.)
(holding that issuing court lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction when all parties
moved from state), review denied, 479 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 1996); John L. Sayon, The
Federal "Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act," 5 INST. OF GOV'T FAM.
L. BULL. 1, 3 (1995) (stating that issuing state loses continuing, exclusive jurisdic-
tion when either: (1) C, CP, and NCP do not reside in issuing state; or (2) parties
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that State 1 appears to have lost its jurisdiction to modify the
child support order in Case 6(c)1 7 reveals a drafting error in both
statutes. It is clear that if CP, C, and NCP leave State 1 and an-
other state modifies the child support order consistently with
UIFSA and FFCCSOA, then the modifying state acquires con-
tinuing, exclusive jurisdiction If, as in Case 6(c), no other
state has modified the State 1 order, there appears to be a void
in jurisdiction over the child support order. State 1 has lost con-
tinuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify, but no other state has
acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
If the sole issue was personal jurisdiction, UIFSA would
continue to grant the State 1 court personal jurisdiction over
W/CP because she "resided with the child in [State 1].,,229
UIFSA's provisions governing modification jurisdiction, however,
purport to affect courts' subject matter jurisdiction to modify, at
least in the context of a two-state UIFSA proceeding. If NCP is
the petitioner, the only state that clearly possesses subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to modify the child support order under UIFSA is
State 2, the state where CP resides. ° Since financial support is-
sues are usually interrelated and State 1 is the only state with
jurisdiction to modify alimony, NCP may want State 1 to con-
sider the requested child support modification.
consented to jurisdiction in another state). But see Kenitzer, 475 S.E.2d at 820
(asserting that UIFSA section 205(a)(1) "does not state, either by express terms or
by implication, that Virginia [the issuing state] loses all jurisdiction if none of the
parties are residents of [Virginia]") (emphasis added).
227 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205 cmt. ("[I]f all the relevant per-
sons-the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child-have permanently left the
issuing state, the issuing state no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties
or child to justify exercise of jurisdiction to modify."); see also Fred Cornish et al.,
Oklahoma Introductory Comment on the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,
reprinted in 43 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 601 (West Supp. 1996) ("[This section]
overrules Bailey v. Bailey, 867 P.2d 1267 (Okla. 1994), which authorized the district
court to exercise continuing jurisdiction even though all parties and the child had
left the state.").
22 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(d) (West Supp. 1996); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 205(c). Other states have jurisdiction to enforce a support order. See
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(g) (West Supp. 1996); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
§ 205(c). Moreover, a court has the inherent power to punish contempt of its own
order. Porter, 684 A.2d at 261; State v. Price, 672 A.2d 893, 898 (R.I. 1996); see
CLAR, supra note 12, at 675.
229 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201(3) (amended 1996);
Kenitzer, 475 S.E.2d at 820.
23 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611(a)(1). Conversely, if CP is the
petitioner, the only state with clear subject matter jurisdiction to modify child sup-
port under UIFSA is State 3, the state in which NCP resides. Id.
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Allowing the parties to consent to State l's jurisdiction to
modify the child support order, even if State 1 would not other-
wise have modification jurisdiction, is one possible solution to
the dilemma created by this "gap" in jurisdiction.231 The statu-
tory language on consent, however, does not quite fit this hypo-
thetical. Both UIFSA and FFCCSOA assume there is a court
with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, a court with which the
parties must file their written consent to a different state's
modification jurisdiction. 2 That assumption does not apply to
Case 6(c), where State 1, the issuing state, has lost continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction even though the parties may wish to con-
sent to State 1's jurisdiction to modify. Both UIFSA and
FFCCSOA, however, could be construed to allow the parties to
consent to jurisdiction. In order to avoid potentially inconsistent
judicial determinations, however, the statutes should be
amended to clarify this result.233
But what if the respondent objects to State l's jurisdiction to
modify in the UIFSA proceeding? A possible solution to this
problem, adopted in Porter v. Porter,234 is to allow the issuing
state to retain modification jurisdiction until another state prop-
erly exercises modification jurisdiction. In Porter, the parties re-
ceived a divorce decree in Rhode Island and F/NCP moved to
Massachusetts. M/CP then obtained a child support order in
Rhode Island. CP and C moved to Florida for four years, then
returned to Rhode Island, where CP filed a motion to modify the
support order and to hold NCP in contempt for nonpayment.
NCP filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that CP's and C's four-
1 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1996); UNIF. INTERSTATE
FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 205(a)(2), 611(a)(2).
22 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e)(2)(B) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333)
("A court of a State may modify a child support order issued by a court of another
State if ... each individual contestant has filed written consent with the State of
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for a court of another State to modify the or-
der: .... ") (emphasis added); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(a)(2) ("A
tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistent with the law of this State
has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order ... until all of the
parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this
State for a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, ex-
clusive jurisdiction.") (emphasis added); Isabel M. v. Thomas M., 624 N.Y.S.2d 356,
361 (Fain. Ct. 1995) (holding under FFCCSOA that New York court did not have ju-
risdiction to modify Pennsylvania support order where parties failed to file written
notice of consent to jurisdiction).
23 See infra Part II(B) and Appendix.
684 A.2d 259 (R.I. 1996).
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year absence from Rhode Island terminated the family court's
jurisdiction over the matter.
The trial court granted NCP's motion to dismiss, but the
Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed. The appellate court
noted that the family court had statutorily-conferred continuing
jurisdiction to modify.235 The court recognized that, under
FFCCSOA, 36 another state's proper modification of the child
support order would terminate Rhode Island's continuing juris-
diction to modify.237 The court noted, however, that no state had
modified the order:
Although "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction!' is not defined in
[FFCCSOA], we interpret the phrase as drawing a distinction
between "continuing jurisdiction" and "exclusive jurisdiction."
The jurisdiction of the court originally issuing a child-support
order may continue beyond the removal of parties from the state
but the jurisdiction may no longer be exclusive under the act.
That is, the jurisdiction of the originating state continues even
after the contestants and their children leave the state, until
such time as a new state of residence modifies the order. If, be-
fore such a modification occurs, a contestant or a child returns,
the originating state's jurisdiction is again exclusive and no
longer subject to modification by another state under the act,
save by agreement of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e)(2)(B).
Thus, subsection (d) provides for the continuing, exclusive ju-
risdiction of the originating state if a child or a contestant re-
sides there, whether continuously or upon return, unless a court
of another state has modified the order in accordance with sub-
section (e). s
Id. at 261-62. The opinion does not explicitly state whether the court is ad-
dressing the family courts subject matter jurisdiction to modify or the court's ability
to exercise personal jurisdiction over NCP. Since the opinion references FFCCSOA,
a subject matter jurisdiction statute, the court probably meant to address the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction in this portion of the opinion.
's Rhode Island had not yet adopted UIFSA.
27 Porter, 684 A.2d at 262. The court noted that modification by another state
would not terminate Rhode Island's jurisdiction to hold NCP in contempt. Id. at 261;
see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(g) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333) ("A
court of a State that no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a child sup-
port order may enforce the order with respect to nonmodifiable obligations and un-
satisfied obligations that accrued before the date on which a modification of the or-
der is made under subsections (e) and ()."); see also UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORTACT § 205(c) (amended 1996).
's Porter, 684 A.2d at 263. In Commonwealth ex rel. Kenitzer v. Richter, 475
S.E.2d 817, 818 (Va. 1996), CP and NCP moved to California and South Carolina
after Virginia issued a divorce decree containing the child support order. CP sought
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The difference between Porter and Case 6(c) is that in Por-
ter, CP resided in State 1 when she sought the modification. In
Case 6(c), both CP and NCP left State 1 and do not reside in
State 1 at the time the motion to modify was filed. Despite this
difference, the concept that the issuing state retains "continuing"
but not "exclusive" jurisdiction to modify a child support order
when no other state has modified the order can be profitably
transported to Case 6(c). 39 Allowing State 1 to exercise jurisdic-
tion to modify the child support order will harmonize the result
in a UIFSA two-state proceeding forwarded to State 1 with the
result of a direct filing in State 1. If, however, another state has
exercised modification jurisdiction, State 1 loses modification ju-
risdiction.40
Case 6(d): NCP seeks modification of visitation or custody in
the State 3 UIFSA proceeding. Assume the same facts as in Case
6(a) except that, in responding to the UIFSA proceeding in
State 3, NCP moves to enforce his visitation rights or to modify
visitation or custody. Can the State 3 court address these issues
in the UIFSA proceeding?
State 3 cannot enforce NCP's visitation rights or modify visi-
tation or custody.241 One of the major purposes of UIFSA, to
to recover alleged arrearages through a somewhat circuitous route. She registered
the Virginia order in her home state of California, and then forwarded a URESA
petition to Virginia, where Virginia's IV-D agency moved for a judgment of arrear-
ages and interest. Id. at 819. The trial court held that Virginia lacked subject matter
jurisdiction since South Carolina had stayed an earlier request by CP to institute
automatic withholding of NCP's wages. Id. The appellate court reversed, holding
that "Virginia [the issuing state] continues to have the right to enforce its own de-
crees even if all parties are no longer residents .... When South Carolina declined to
issue an income-withholding order and made no determination of arrearages, [CP]
could invoke Virginia's jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its own decree." Id.
at 820-21 (emphasis added). The court thereby clarified that an issuing court is not
required to have "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" merely to enforce an order.
29 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(d) (West Supp. 1996); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 205(a); see also infra Part II(C) and Appendix (proposing amend-
ments to UIFSA and FFCCSOA to resolve this dilemma).
210 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
2"1 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 305(d) ("A responding tribunal
of this State may not condition the payment of a support order issued under this
[Act] upon compliance by a party with provisions for visitation."); Chaisson v.
Ragsdale, 914 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Ark. 1996) (holding that UIFSA does not authorize
jurisdiction over custody and setoff); State ex rel. Finley v. Robinson, 842 S.W.2d 47,
48 (Ark. 1992) (stating that under URESA court cannot determine visitation rights);
Department of Human Servs. v. Pavlovich, No. 82,363, 1996 WL 297413 (Okla. Sup.
Ct. June 4, 1996) (holding that under URESA State 3 needs UCCJA jurisdiction to
modify child support order) (citations omitted); cf. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
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streamline multi-state procedures for support enforcement,
would be defeated if parties could "counterclaim" on issues col-
lateral to support. 2 Unlike filing a civil lawsuit in a foreign
state, which subjects the plaintiff to the personal jurisdiction of
that state with respect to any counterclaims filed by the defen-
dant, 3 the forwarding of a UIFSA proceeding to a state that
would not normally have jurisdiction over custody issues' does
not subject the petitioner to custody claims asserted by the re-
spondent. 45
Case 6(e): CP seeks modification of child support in State 3
proceeding. Assume the same facts as in Case 6(a). In addition
to instituting a UIFSA enforcement proceeding in State 2, CP
also seeks to increase NCP's child support obligation as part of
SUPPORT ACT § 314(a) ("Participation by a [petitioner] in a proceeding before a re-
sponding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services pro-
vided by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over
the [petitioner] in another proceeding.").
242 Some father's rights advocates, however, forcefully assert that NCP's access
to visitation is one of the principal determinants of NCP's compliance with his child
support obligation. These advocates argue that a closer link exists between issues of
financial and emotional support. See Interstate Modification Hearings, supra note 9,
at 84 (positing that one of three principal determinants of child support compliance
is access to children); Chavez, supra note 29, at 6-9 (surveying studies showing
positive correlation between noncustodial parents' adequate visitation with children
and compliance with child support obligations); see also CLARK, supra note 12, at
280 ("If the contacts with the responding state are sufficiently close to justify either
a divorce or a custody proceeding, and if all issues are or can be brought before the
same court, there seems good reason to permit the court to deal with the other mat-
ters in addition to support.").
The 1996 welfare reform bill addressed this concern by providing that the new
"Administration for Children and Families shall make grants ... to enable States to
establish and administer programs to support and facilitate noncustodial parents'
access to and visitation of their children .... " 42 U.S.C.A. § 669b(a) (West Supp.
1996).
' See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
2' Under the PKPA, the child's home state is the favored jurisdiction for cus-
tody issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1994). The UCCJA, to a lesser extent,
further supports this proposition. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
§ 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 151 (1988).
2,- See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 305 cmt. ("[U]nder a UIFSA
action the petitioner generally is not present before the tribunal. This distinction
justifies prohibiting visitation issues from being litigated in the context of a support
proceeding."). Similarly, if NCP raised a claim that State 3 would need personal ju-
risdiction over CP to decide, such as modification of child support, the forwarding of
a UIFSA proceeding to State 3 would not subject OP to State 3's jurisdiction to de-
cide that claim. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 314(a); id. § 314 cmt.
(stating that under section 314(a) "direct or indirect participation in a UIFSA pro-
ceeding does not subject a petitioner to an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
petitioner by the forum state in other litigation between the parties").
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her UIFSA proceeding forwarded to State 3. Can the State 3
court order the modification CP requests?
Yes; State 3 has jurisdiction to modify the child support or-
der under UIFSA section 611(a)(1)." All parties no longer reside
in State 1. The "petitioner," CP, is a nonresident of State 3.247
State 3 has personal jurisdiction over NCP since NCP is a citizen
of State 3.48 The same result, allowing State 3 to modify the
State 1 order, is reached under FFCCSOA.249
Another issue is which state's law State 3 should apply to
determine whether the increase should be ordered. Assume that
the ground for CP's request to increase child support is that in-
flation eroded the purchasing power of the original award. As-
sume further that State 1 and State 2 recognize inflation as a po-
tential reason for an increase while State 3 does not.25  Which
state's law should the State 3 court apply in considering the re-
quested increase?
The short answer is probably the law of the forum state,
State 3. This seems clear under FFCCSOA. The answer may be
the same under UIFSA, but one could plausibly read UIFSA as
supplying a different answer.
FFCCSOA section (h) provides:
(1) In general.-In a proceeding to establish, modify, or enforce
a child support order, the forum State's law shall apply except
as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3).
246 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611(a)(1). CP must follow the
statutory procedure for registration of the order in State 3, see supra notes 216-18
and accompanying text, either before or contemporaneously with her request for
modification. See UNIF. INTERTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 609.
217 "Subsection (a)(1) contemplate[s] that the issuing state has lost continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction and that the obligee may seek modification in the obligor's
state of residence, or that the obligor may seek a modification in the obligee's state
of residence." UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611 cmt.
24 See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940) (recognizing domicile as
valid basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction). State 3 may not, however, "modify
any aspect of a child-support order that may not be modified under the law of the
issuing state [State 1]." UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611(c).
249 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333);
Isabel M. v. Thomas M., 624 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (Fain. Ct. 1995); Kelly v. Otte, 474
S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 1996 WL 762108 (N.C. Dec. 5, 1996).
220 Compare Pope v. Pope, 342 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that material increase in cost of maintaining and providing for children was
sufficient to allow modification of support award), with Baker v. Baker, 332 S.E.2d
550, 552 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Inflation, without more, is insufficient to establish
changed circumstances or justify an increase in alimony.").
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(2) Law of State of Issuance of Order.-In interpreting a child
support order including the duration of current payments and
other obligations of support, a court shall apply the law of the
State of the court that issued the order.
(3) Period of Limitation.-In an action to enforce arrears under
a child support order, a court shall apply the statute of limita-
tion of the forum State or the State of the court that issued the
order, whichever statute provides the longer period of limita-
tion.!"
Unless the original order contains a provision regarding inflation
that requires "interpretation," subsection (h)(2) does not apply.
In addition, subsection (h)(3) does not apply because Case 6(e)
does not involve a statute of limitations. Case 6(e) would
therefore be governed by the "general" rule stated in subsection
(h)(1) and the law of State 3, the forum state, would apply to the
modification petition.
UIFSA's drafters probably intended that the law of the fo-
rum state would apply,12 but the statutory language is ambigu-
ous and allows an alternative interpretation. UIFSA's section
303, the general choice-of-law provision that applies to all UIFSA
proceedings, =3 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this [Act], a responding tribu-
nal of this State:
(1) shall apply the procedural and substantive law, includ-
ing the rules on choice of law, generally applicable to similar
proceedings originating in this State and may exercise all
powers and provide all remedies available in those proceed-
ings; and
(2) shall determine the duty of support and the amount pay-
able in accordance with the law and support guidelines of
this State. 4
Subsection (2) appears to indicate that the law of State 3
should apply.25 State 3 is the "responding tribunal" and CP is
2' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(h) (West Supp. 1996).
252 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT prefatory note ("[UIFSA] pro-
rides that the procedures and law of the forum apply, with some significant addi-
tions or exceptions .... "); id. § 303 cmt.
See id. § 301(a); id. prefatory note (stating that "separate articles are created
for provisions common to all types of actions (Article 3)"). Section 303 is within Ar-
ticle 3.
254 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 303.
See also id. § 303 cmt. ("Historically states have insisted that forum law be
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asking State 3 to "determine" the "amount" of support "payable."
In addition to the apparent statutory mandate that the law of
the forum state should apply, family law courts often apply the
forum-state's law with little or no analysis of choice of law prin-
ciples. 5 ' Subsection 303(1), however, complicates this analysis.
It could be argued that subsection 303(1) merely requires State 3
to apply State 3's "rules on choice of law." Under those choice-of-
law principles, State 3 might be required to apply the law of
State 1 or State 2." '
Moreover, UIFSA section 604 provides competing choice-of-
law rules specifically applicable to enforcement and modification
proceedings.258 Section 604, entitled "Choice of Law," tends to
counteract the general "forum-state" rule of section 303:
(a) The law of the issuing state [State 1] governs the nature, ex-
tent, amount, and duration of current payments and other obli-
gations of support and the payment of arrearages under the or-
der.
(b) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation un-
der the laws of this State or of the issuing state, whichever is
longer, applies.
Section 604(a) could be interpreted broadly enough to swal-
low the general "forum-state" rule of section 303. While the
commentary reveals that the drafters did not intend section
604(a) always to override the "forum-state" rule of section 303,259
the phrase "nature, extent, [and] amount ... of current pay-
ments" is imprecise.
The only example given by the official comment to UIFSA
section 604 does not apply to Case 6(e):
This section identifies situations in which local law is inappli-
applied to support cases whenever possible.").
26 See CLARK, supra note 12, at 284.
25 See In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Ill. 1990) (holding that
Illinois' choice-of-law rules required application of Florida law to determine pater-
nity and duty of support in Illinois divorce proceeding where wife claimed support
for child conceived during marriage through artificial insemination in Florida);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 cmt. b (1989).
2"8 Article 6 of UIFSA, within which section 604 appears, is entitled
"Enforcement and Modification of Support Order After Registration." See also UNIF.
INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT prefatory note (asserting that Article 6 contains
provisions for "the enforcement and modification of support orders after registra-
tion").
29 See id. §604 cmt. ("This section identifies situations in which local law is in-
applicable.").
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cable .... For example, under Subsection (a) the responding
state must recognize and enforce an order of the issuing state
for the support of the child under age 21, notwithstanding the
fact that the duty of support of a child ends at age 18 under the
law of the responding state.260
The comment clarifies the part of subsection 604(a) that ad-
dresses the "duration of current payments and other obligations
of support."261 This example, however, sheds little light on the
meaning of the phrase "the nature, extent, [or] amount ... of cur-
rent payments and other obligations of support."
26 2
Under UIFSA, therefore, the crucial question presented by
Case 6(e) is whether a request for an increase in child support
due to inflation constitutes an issue regarding "the nature [or]
extent ... of current payments and other obligations of support."
If a court determines that such a request falls within section
1604(a), a conclusion that would not be facially unreasonable,
then the law of State 1, the issuing state, applies.
If FFCCSOA requires the application of the forum state's
law while UIFSA indicates that another state's law governs,263
FFCCSOA may preempt UIFSA. Courts could avoid the issue of
federal preemption and harmonize the results obtained under
the two laws by concluding, as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, that whether child support should be increased due to in-
flation is not an issue of "the nature, extent, amount, and dura-
tion of current payments and other obligations of support." This
interpretation would not trigger the application of "issuing-state"
law under UIFSA section 604(a).2
A word might be added here about the policy behind the rule
that the forum state should usually apply its own law. The
drafters of UIFSA emphasized ease of judicial administration
and recognized that courts were likely to apply the law of their
own state.265 As this hypothetical suggests, however, this rule
20 Id. (citations omitted); see also Sampson, supra note 12, at nn.134-36.
211 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 604(a).
262 Id.
213 See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
214 See infra Part H(D) and Appendix (proposing amendments to UIFSA section
604).
263 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 303 cmt. ("Historically states
have insisted that forum law be applied to support cases whenever possible .... To
insure the efficient processing of the huge number of interstate support cases, it is
vital that decision-makers apply familiar rules of local law to the maximum degree
possible.").
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does not result in the most equitable solution in every case.
NCP's move to State 3, which frowns on inflation as a ground for
an increase in child support, is entirely fortuitous under these
facts.
266
Moreover, the regular application of the law of the forum
state raises the potentially more far-reaching question of
whether CP may seek an increase in child support because
State 3's child support guidelines 27 would result in a higher child
support award than State l's guidelines initially authorized.26 A
request to modify an award merely because one of the parties
has moved to a state with different guidelines would appear not
to meet any standard of "changed circumstances" sufficient to
warrant modification.269 Different areas of the country, however,
have markedly different costs of living, ° and it is possible that
interstate moves will cause real changes in the parties' needs
and available resources. By omitting any specific reference to
this issue, UIFSA and FFCCSOA appear to leave the issue to be
266 See CLARK, supra note 12, at 284 ("In the vast majority of cases there is no
difference between the laws of the various states, but where there is, there is no en-
tirely satisfactory way of resolving the conflict thus created.").
Federal law requires states to adopt numerical guidelines that provide a
"rebuttable presumption" for child support awards. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1994).
Federal law does not prescribe the nature of the guidelines and states have adopted
a number of different formulas for determination of awards. See generally Linda
Henry Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. L. 103, 118-23 (1990) (discussing guidelines states could adopt to deter-
mine appropriate child support awards).
268 Conversely, NCP might seek a decrease because State 2's guidelines would
result in a lower award than State l's. For example, Illinois uses a percentage of in-
come model, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/505(a)(1) (West 1996), while Oklahoma
uses an income shares model. OKLA- STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 118, 119 (West Supp.
1997). Assume that: H/NCP grosses $2,000 per month and nets $1,500 per month;
W/CP grosses $1,500 per month; there are two children and day care for these chil-
dren costs $400 per month; and medical insurance for the children is $100 per
month. Under the Illinois guidelines, the award of child support to W/CP would be
$350.00 per month plus a probable award of $100.00 per month for the medical in-
surance. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/505(a)(4) (West 1996); id. § 5/505.2(b)(1).
Assuming that CP paid day care and medical insurance, the award under the Okla-
homa guidelines would be $640.55 per month.
2619 See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 316(a), 9 U.L.A. 147 (1987); cf. In re
Abel, 886 P.2d 1139, 1141-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court's applica-
tion of Montana guidelines to reduce amount of child support decree obtained in
Washington even though ex-wife and children had moved to Montana).
270 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 488 (1996). For the third quarter of 1995, the cost of living index ranged
from 87.0 in Fort Smith, Arkansas, to 221.1 in New York City. Id. at 488-89.
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resolved on a case-by-case basis."'
Case 6(f): NCP seeks modification of child support in State 3
proceeding. Assume the same facts as in Case 6(a): that CP ini-
tiates a UIFSA enforcement proceeding in State 2 which is for-
warded to State 3. This time, however, NCP seeks a decrease in
his child support obligation in response to the State 3 UIFSA
proceeding. Can the State 3 court order the modification NCP
requests if NCP has good grounds?
The answer is "no" under UIFSA, but the answer may be
less clear under FFCCSOA. Under UIFSA section 611, the first
element for modification jurisdiction is met because NCP, CP,
and C no longer reside in State 1.272 The second and third ele-
ments, however, are not satisfied. The "petitioner" seeking the
modification, NCP, is a resident of State 3, and CP, on these
facts, is not subject to personal jurisdiction in State 3.273 As the
drafters of UIFSA stated:
This restriction attempts to achieve a rough justice between the
parties in the majority of cases by preventing a litigant from
choosing to seek modification in a local tribunal to the marked
disadvantage of the other party. For example, an obligor visit-
ing the children at the residence of the obligee cannot be validly
served with citation accompanied by a motion to modify the
support order. 4
State 3, therefore, does not have jurisdiction to modify the child
support order under UIFSA.
A slight alteration of the facts reveals a potentially different
answer under FFCCSOA. Assume that CP drives C to State 3 to
begin a scheduled visitation with NCP after she filed a UIFSA
proceeding. While physically present in State 3, NCP serves CP
with a petition to modify his child support obligation, styled ei-
ther as a response to CP's UIFSA proceeding or as an independ-
ent proceeding filed in State 3. State 3 probably has personal
271 Cf. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 1, at 234 ("The law of the forum state
governs application of support guidelines in the establishment or modification of a
support award.") (emphasis added).
' After a child-support order issued in another state has been registered
in this State, the responding tribunal of this State may modify that order
only if Section 613 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds
that: (1) the following requirements are met: (i) the child, the individual
obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state ....
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611(a)(1)(i) (amended 1996).
273 See id. §611(a)(1)(ii)-(iii).
274 See id. § 611 cmt.
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jurisdiction over CP to hear the child support modification peti-
tion because CP was properly served with process while physi-
cally present in State 3.275 Nevertheless, the second element of
modification jurisdiction under UIFSA would not be satisfied.
The "petitioner," NCP, seeking the modification is not "a non-
resident" of State 3. Thus, UIFSA prohibits State 3 from modify-
ing the child support order at NCP's request.276
FFCCSOA, however, does not contain the "nonresident peti-
tioner" restriction on modification jurisdiction. Newly-amended
subsection (e) merely provides that:
A court of a State may modify a child support order issued by a
court of another State if-
(1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child support
order pursuant to subsection (i); and
(2)(A) the court of the other State no longer has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order because that
State no longer is the child's State or the residence of any
individual contestant .... 277
Subsection (i) allows the party seeking to modify the order to
register the order "in a State with jurisdiction over the
nonmovant for the purpose of modification."278
If the word "jurisdiction" in subsection (i) refers only to per-
sonal jurisdiction over the nonmovant, then FFCCSOA does not
appear to prohibit State 3 from modifying the child support order
since State 3 can exercise personal jurisdiction over CP. Sub-
section (e)(1) appears satisfied since State 3 has personal juris-
diction over CP and NCP has filed his petition in the State 3 tri-
bunal with subject matter jurisdiction over child support
matters. Subsection (e)(2)(A) is also satisfied because State 1
2"' Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620 (1990) (holding that state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident served with process while tempo-
rarily in that state, even when suit is unrelated to activities within state). Personal
jurisdiction might be defeated if NCP fraudulently enticed CP into State 3. See, e.g.,
Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1937); Neotex Mfg. Co. v. Eid-
inger, 294 N.Y.S. 767, 768 (App. Div. 1937); Waljohn Waterstop, Inc. v. Webster, 232
N.Y.S.2d 665, 666-67 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
276 UIFSA would permit State 3 to modify the child support order upon a re-
quest by CP. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611(a)(1); see also David
S. Dolowitz, Jurisdiction Issues in Child Custody, Visitation and Support Cases, 9
UTAH B.J. 10, 13 (1996) (noting that UIFSA prevents foreign court from modifying
order of issuing state while parent or child continues to reside in issuing state).
277 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(e) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
278 See id. § 1738B(i).
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lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order
when NCP, CP, and C moved out of the state. Since the statute
does not contain any additional explicit restrictions, it appears
that State 3 is free to assume modification jurisdiction under
FFCCSOA.
Interpreting the word "jurisdiction" in FFCCSOA subsection
(i) to mean both personal jurisdiction and subject matter juris-
diction to modify would avoid the anomaly of reaching different
results under FFCCSOA and UIFSA. FFCCSOA subsection (i)
requires that State 3 have "jurisdiction over the nonmovant for
the purpose of modification" of the child support order.27 9 Since
State 3 would not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the
child support order under UIFSA, it could be argued that State 3
does not have "jurisdiction over the nonmovant for the purpose of
modification" under FFCCSOA. This construction would har-
monize the results attained under FFCCSOA and UIFSA.280
Case 6(g): The human error factor.2"' Assume that in Case
6(f), where NCP improperly sought a modification in the State 3
UIFSA proceeding, the State 3 court erroneously believed it had
jurisdiction under UIFSA section 611 to reduce NCP's child sup-
port obligation. Assume further that the court ordered the re-
duction and CP did not appeal that order. NCP then returns to
State 1, where CP seeks enforcement of the original State 1 or-
der. Is the State 1 court bound by the State 3 court's order,
27 Id.
" Congress enacted the latest amendments to FFCCSOA in order to make the
federal statute more consistent with UIFSA. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-725, re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2651; Haynes, supra note 145, at 26, 29-30.
These amendments evidence Congress' intention to harmonize the two statutes,
rather than allowing FFCCSOA to preempt UIFSA. The desire to achieve uniform
results is consistent with the legislative history of the original FFCCSOA. See S.
REP. No. 103-361, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259 ("[T]he bill ... provide[s] that
a State court may not modify an order of another State court requiring the payment
of child support unless the recipient of child support payments resides in the State
in which the modification is sought ..... )  The language ultimately enacted by Con-
gress, however, does not necessarily compel this result. See infra Part I1(E) and Ap-
pendix (proposing amendments to clarify FFCCSOA in order to harmonize
FFCCSOA and UIFSA).
2 ' A similar situation would arise if State 3 was operating under URESA and
the State 3 court either ignored FFCCSOA or improperly decided that it could still
make a de novo determination of support. See OCSE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at
1-7; Haynes, supra note 145, at 30. Additionally, Professor Sampson has suggested
that "you could have two orders under UIFSA in a UIFSA state when the parties
don't communicate, don't serve properly, et cetera." NCCUSL Proceedings, supra
note 4, at 27.
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which erroneously reduced NCP's child support obligation?282
The statutes operate on the presumption that they will be
correctly applied. They do not provide an easy answer when that
presumption proves false. Two separate interpretive paths lead
to conflicting conclusions.
The initial step on the first path of statutory analysis is
noting that UIFSA section 612 requires the issuing tribunal to
"recognize a modification of its earlier child support order by a
tribunal of another state which assumed jurisdiction pursuant to
a law substantially similar to this [Act] .,,83 CP could argue
that State 3 modified the order in spite of UIFSA, not "pursuant
to" UIFSA.2" Since State 3 erroneously exercised jurisdiction to
modify the order, the State 1 court could decline to recognize the
modification and enforce the original (State 1) support order.
Similarly, FFCCSOA requires State 1 to "enforce according
to its terms a child support order made consistently with this
section by a court of another State."285 In order for the State 3
court to have made its order "consistently with" FFCCSOA, the
court must have had, "pursuant to the laws of [State 3] ... , (A) ...
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and enter such an
order .... CP could argue that "the laws of" State 3 include
UIFSA section 611, which did not grant State 3 subject matter
jurisdiction to modify the order. CP would assert, therefore, that
State 3's order was not made "consistently with" FFCCSOA and
that State 1 is not required to give the State 3 order full faith
2"2 If State 3 did not have personal jurisdiction over CP to render the modifica-
tion, or if CP did not receive notice and opportunity to be heard in the State 3 pro-
ceeding, State 3's order would be void. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The remainder
of this hypothetical assumes that State 3 had personal jurisdiction over CP and that
CP received proper notice.
283 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 612 (emphasis added). This Article
assumes that a "law substantially similar to this [Act]" means UIFSA and not
URESA.
214 Id. § 612. The official comment to UIFSA section 612 further supports CP's
argument. "[Dieference to the support order of a sister state ... applies not just to
the original order, but also to a modified child support order issued by a second
state under the standards established by Section 611 .... UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 612 cmt. (emphasis added). State 3 modified the order in violation of
section 611 because the "petitioner" seeking modification, NCP, was a resident of
State 3, the modifying state. See id. § 611(a)(1)(ii).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(1) (West, WESTIAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
2' Id. § 1738B(c)(1)(A). In order to enter an order "consistently with" FFCCSOA,
State 3 must have met the other requirements of subsection (c) and adhered to sub-
sections (e), (f), and (g). See id. § 1738B(c)(1).
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and credit.
Conversely, NCP could argue that CP had the opportunity to
object to State 3's subject matter jurisdiction to modify the order
in the State 3 proceeding. By failing to assert that UIFSA sec-
tion 611 prevented the modification, CP waived the objection to
subject matter jurisdiction, 7 and State 1, therefore, should
"recognize""'8 and "enforce""8 9 the State 3 order.
UIFSA section 207 and FFCCSOA subsection (f) provide the
second statutory path in analyzing Case 6(g).29 These sections
set forth rules of priority governing competing support orders for
the same obligor and obligee or child.9 1 The first rule of priority
is that if only one of the issuing tribunals would have continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA, the order of that tribunal
controls.292
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1985) (stating that, subject
to exception, "[wihen a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the
judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court's subject
matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation ..."); id. § 11 cmt. d; BRILMAYER, supra
note 10, at 44; Reynolds, supra note 10, at 428-29 (opining that Supreme Court has
issued disparate rulings on when, if ever, subject matter jurisdiction can be collat-
erally attacked). NCP can assert an even stronger argument if CP objected to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in State 3 and State 3 erroneously rejected CP's argument.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. c ("When the question of the
tribunals jurisdiction is raised in the original action, in a modem procedural regime
there is no reason why the determination of the issue should not thereafter be con-
clusive under the usual rules of issue preclusion."); Reynolds, supra note 10, at 426-
30.
28 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 612.
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(f) (West Supp. 1996); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 207.
" UIFSA's drafters assumed that section 207 would be needed when one of the
states applied URESA, not if a state applied UIFSA incorrectly. See UNIF. IN-
TERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 207 cmt.; see also id. prefatory note (stating that
section 207 involves "reconciliation with orders issued before the effective date of
[UIFSA]"); NCCUSL Proceedings, supra note 4, at 27 (remarks of Professor Samp-
son) ("This whole section [207] is about reconciling, going from a multiple-order sys-
tem to a one-order system."). The statutory language, however, is not so limited.
2 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORTACT § 207(b)(1) states:
If a proceeding is brought under this [Act], and two or more child-support
orders have been issued by tribunals of this State or another state with re-
gard to the same obligor and child, a tribunal of this State shall apply the
following rules in determining which order to recognize for purposes of
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: (1) If only one of the tribunals would
have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this [Act], the order of that
tribunal controls and must be so recognized.
Id. FFCCSOA contains substantially the same provision. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738B(f)(2) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333) ("If 2 or more courts
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Under UIFSA, it is likely that neither State 1 nor State 3
has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. State I lost continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction when the parties initially moved out of
State 1.293 Section 205(a)(1) of UIFSA appears to prevent the re-
acquisition by State 1 of "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" after
NCP returns to State 1. Section 205(a)(1) states that the issuing
court retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction "as long as this
State remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee,
or the child ...."2 This language suggests that a continuity of
residence from the date of the order's issuance is necessary for
State 1 to maintain jurisdiction. State 3, if it ever possessed
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,295 lost such jurisdiction when
NCP moved out of State 3. Therefore, UIFSA's first prioritiza-
tion rule296 fails to resolve the dispute.
State 1, however, possibly has continuing, exclusive juris-
diction under FFCCSOA. Subsection (d) of FFCCSOA provides
that:
A court of a State that has made a child support order consis-
tently with this section has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over the order if the State is the child's State or the residence of
any individual contestant unless the court of another State,
acting in accordance with subsections (e) and (f), has made a
modification of the order. 7
State 1 is currently "the residence of' NCP. Further, it can be
argued that State 3 did not act "in accordance with subsections
(e) and (f)" in modifying the order. For modification jurisdiction,
subsection (e) requires the court to have "jurisdiction to make
have issued child support orders for the same obligor and child, and only 1 of the
courts would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this section, the order of
that court must be recognized.").
293 See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text. Even if State 1 had not lost
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, State 1 "loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
with regard to prospective enforcement of the [original] order issued in" State 1
when State 3 modifies that order "pursuant to this [UIFSA] or a law substantially
similar to" UIFSA. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205(c). It could be ar-
gued, however, that State 3 did not modify the order "pursuant to" UIFSA, and
State 1 thus retained continuing, though perhaps not exclusive, jurisdiction. Cf.
Porter v. Porter, 684 A.2d 259, 262-63 (R.I. 1996).
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SupPORT ACT § 205(a)(1) (emphasis added).
21 Arguably, State 3 never acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because it
did not "issu[e] a support order consistent with the law of' State 3. Id. § 205(a).
Since NCP was a resident of State 3, State 3 should not have modified the State 1
order under UIFSA section 611(a). See id. § 611(a).
Id. § 207(b)(1).
2" 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(d) (West Supp. 1996).
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such a child support order pursuant to subsection (i)," 298 which
requires the state to have "jurisdiction over the nonmovant for
the purpose of modification."299 If the word "jurisdiction" is
correctly interpreted to include subject matter jurisdiction, and
not merely personal jurisdiction over CP, 0 then State 3 did not
have "jurisdiction over the nonmovant for the purpose of
modification" under UIFSA section 611.301 State 1 would
therefore have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under
FFCCSOA and its order would take precedence under
FFCCSOA's first rule of priority governing conflicting support
orders.30
The contrary view is that CP had the opportunity to chal-
lenge State 3's modification jurisdiction. Regardless of whether
CP failed to do so, or did so unsuccessfully, the State 3 order
should be considered valid. °3 Under this theory, State 1 lost
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under FFCCSOA subsection (d)
when State 3 modified the order.3°  Thus, the first prioritization
rule provides no definitive answer.
The second prioritization rule states:
If ... two or more child-support orders have been issued by tri-
bunals of this State or another state with regard to the same
obligor and child, ... (2) If more than one of the tribunals would
have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this [Act], an order
issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child con-
trols and must be so recognized, but if an order has not been is-
sued in the current home state of the child, the order most re-
cently issued controls and must be so recognized. 3"
Based upon the above analysis, State 1 and State 3 probably
do not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under either
UIFSA or FFCCSOA. This prioritization rule thus appears in-
applicable. If both states have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,
however,"' then State 3's order, the order "most recently issued,"
2' Id. § 1738B(e)(1) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
2 Id. § 1738B(i).
3" See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
301 28 U.S.CA. § 1738B(i) (West Supp. 1996); see UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORTACT § 611(a)(1) (amended 1996).
312 28 U.S.C.A § 1738B(f) (West Supp. 1996).
:.. See supra note 287-89 and accompanying text.
0 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(d) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
"05 UNIT. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 207(b)(2). FFCCSOA contains es-
sentially the same provision. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(f)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
*.. It appears logically impossible for two states to have continuing, exclusive
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should be given priority."7
The final prioritization rule which may apply to Case 6(g) is
as follows:
If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive juris-
diction under this [Act], the tribunal of this State having juris-
diction over the parties shall issue a child-support order, which
controls and must be so recognized. 08
If neither State 1 nor State 3 has continuing, exclusive ju-
risdiction, this final prioritization rule appears to be applicable.
Applying this rule, however, raises the issue of whether State 1
may recognize and enforce its own original order, as CP requests,
or merely "issue" prospectively a new order. The commentary
supports the latter construction: "[i]f none of the preceding pri-
orities ... apply, the forum tribunal is directed to issue a new or-
der .... The rationale for creating yet another order is that there
is no valid reason under UIFSA to prefer the terms of one of the
multiple orders over another."
30 9
While Case 6(g) and similar cases have generated significant
debate, observers have not reached definitive answers. The
chairperson of the United States Commission on Interstate Child
Support recently asked the question, "[I]f a court modifies an or-
der when it lacks jurisdiction to do so under the FFCCSOA, is
the modified order void, voidable, or res judicata between the
parties if not appealed within a certain time period?" l0 She then
reported that the answer to that question "is under discussion
nationwide."31'
Choosing the better of two imperfect solutions, this Article
concludes that UIFSA and FFCCSOA's overriding policy of rec-
ognizing only one order at a time requires State 1 to recognize
State 3's modification of the order. This result is also consistent
with the weight of authority that precludes re-litigation of a
court's subject matter jurisdiction after the court has rendered
judgment.312 Regardless of the ultimate resolution of this contro-
jurisdiction. The drafters' anticipation of this occurrence is a tribute to their fore-
sight, an implicit recognition of the inherent inconsistencies in the uniform statutes,
or perhaps both.
107 State 2, the child's home state, has not issued an order in this hypothetical.
308 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 207(b)(3); see 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738B(f((4) (West Supp. 1996) (containing substantially similar provision).
109 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 207 cmt.
310 Haynes, supra note 145, at 31.
311 Id.
312 See supra note 287; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13,
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versy, CP has an immediate remedy since UIFSA section 611
allows CP to seek a further modification of the order in State 1.313
As a practical matter, therefore, CP should ask State 1 either to
enforce its original order or, in the alternative, to modify
State 3's order.
II. PROPOSALS TO CLARIFY UIFSA AND FFCCSOA
Based upon the preceding discussion, this Article proposes
amendments to UIFSA and FFCCSOA as follows.
A. Competing Petitions to Establish Support Filed in Two
States
As discussed in Cases 2(b) and 2(c), 314 UIFSA prioritization
rules operate ambiguously when the parties contemporaneously
file petitions for support in two different states and there is ei-
ther no home state of a child or no child. The drafters of UIFSA
intended the first-filed petition to have priority.31 UIFSA section
204(a)(3) should be amended to clarify ambiguous language and
ensure achievement of this desired result.316 Section 204(a)(3)
should be amended from "(a) A tribunal of this State may exer-
cise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the [petition] or
comparable pleading is filed after a pleading is filed in another
state only if: ... (3) if relevant, this State is the home state of the
child" to "(3) this state is the home state of a child for whom a
child support order is sought to be established." This proposed
amendment would clarify that a State 2 court would not have
jurisdiction to establish a support order when a petition for child
support has already been filed in State 1 unless State 2 is the
home state of the child. In cases 2(b) and 2(c), the first-filed pe-
tition would certainly have priority because a court receiving the
second-fied petition in another state would not be empowered to
act upon it.
As also discussed, UIFSA's drafters assumed that giving the
child's home state priority would accomplish the goal of keeping
cmt. c (1981).3 All parties have left State 3, now regarded as the "issuing state"; the
"petitioner" for modification, CP, is a nonresident of State 1; and State 1 can exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over NCP, its resident. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 611(a)(1).
3 4 See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
3'5 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
316 The Appendix contains proposed language for all suggested amendments.
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child custody and child support determinations in the same pro-
ceeding."' The UCCJA and PKPA, however, do not always oper-
ate to give priority to the child's home state.318 In order to avoid
bifurcated proceedings, UIFSA section 204 should be amended to
add new subsections which authorize the court that has child
custody jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction of the child support
issue. This Article proposes that an additional subsection be
added to section 204. The proposed subsection provides:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a tribunal of this State may
exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the [petition]
or comparable pleading is filed in this State after a [petition] or
comparable pleading is filed in another state, if (1) the condi-
tions of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are met; and (2) the
[petition] or comparable pleading raises issues of both child sup-
port and child custody, and the tribunal of this State determines
that it properly may take jurisdiction of the child custody issues
pursuant to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
This proposal may seem to aggravate the indefiniteness of
the custody jurisdiction determination. To be sure, it sacrifices
the predictability of a hard-and-fast first-filed rule. However, so
long as petitioners seek custody and support in the same pro-
ceeding, and the PKPA and UCCJA do not definitively mandate
custody jurisdiction in a particular state, an inflexible rule on
child support jurisdiction will occasionally result in a bifurcation
of issues.31
B. Additional Ways of Consenting to Jurisdiction to Modify
1. Consent to Jurisdiction to Modify a Spousal Support Order
As discussed above in Cases 4(d), 5(b), and 6(b),32' the parties
may wish to consent to a court's jurisdiction to modify a spousal
support order even though UIFSA would not otherwise provide
for such consent.32' This Article proposes that the parties be al-
317 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmt. ("Given the ... pos-
sibility that custody and support are both involved in the case, UIFSA opts for ...
establishing a priority for the tribunal in the child's home state.").
319 Id. (noting that UCCJA "chooses 'first-filing' as the method for resolving
competing jurisdiction disputes").
319 Cf. Lustig v. Lustig, 1996 WL 679693 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1996).
320 See supra notes 182-90, 201-15, 219-21 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
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lowed to consent to the jurisdiction of a state other than the issu-
ing state to modify an alimony award. Even though this pro-
posal clashes with the general belief of the UIFSA drafters that
interstate modification of alimony was ill-advised," the ration-
ales given by the drafters in support of their position are not
particularly persuasive.
First, the official comment to UIFSA section 205 asserts that
interstate modification of alimony has been "relatively rare.
"323
Even if this statement is true, it constitutes an insufficient rea-
son for entirely forbidding interstate modification when the par-
ties consent. Second, the comment notes that the states' laws
regarding alimony issues vary widely.3 24  The states' laws on
child support, however, are hardly uniform and UIFSA allows
modification of child support orders. Finally, the drafters be-
lieved that an improvement in the obligor's status may justify an
increase in child support, but not alimony.325 This merely consti-
tutes an argument against modifications of spousal support or-
ders due to changes in circumstances and does not justify the
prohibition of interstate modification of alimony in all circum-
stances, particularly if the parties consent to jurisdiction.
In order to avoid bifurcation of support issues, this Article
proposes that subsection (f) of UIFSA section 205 be amended to
read as follows:
(f) A tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistent
with the law of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over a spousal support order throughout the existence of the
support obligation, unless and until all of the parties who are
individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this
State for a tribunal of another state to modify the spousal sup-
port order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. A tri-
bunal of this State may not modify a spousal support order is-
sued by a tribunal of another state having continuing, exclusive
32 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205 cmt.
323 Id.
S32 Id. Moreover, the comment provides as an example that "states take widely
varying views of the effect on a spousal support order of the obligee's remarriage or
nonmarital cohabitation." Id. This would presumably be an issue of the "duration of
current payments and other obligations of support" and hence, the issuing state's
law would apply under UIFSA section 604(a). See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 604(a).
2 "This disparity is founded on a policy choice that post-divorce success of an
obligor-parent should benefit the obligor's child, but not the obligor's ex-spouse." Id.
§ 205 cmt.
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jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state, unless
and until all of the parties who are individuals have filed writ-
ten consents with the tribunal of the other state for a tribunal of
this State to modify the spousal-support order and assume con-
tinuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
When neither party resides in the issuing state, such as in
Case 6(b), this amendment would allow the responding state to
entertain a party's motion for modification of a spousal support
order.
2. Consent to Jurisdiction to Modify Child Support Orders
As discussed in Case 6(c),3"6 the parties may be unable to
conduct a modification hearing in the issuing state for both
spousal and child support obligations if the issuing state lost
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the child support or-
der but retains continuing, excessive jurisdiction to modify the
spousal support order. Neither the UIFSA nor FFCCSOA provi-
sions governing consent to jurisdiction to modify child support
orders account for the possibility that the parties may wish to
consent to the jurisdiction of the original issuing state to modify
the order. This potential bifurcation of support issues can be
rectified by adding the following consent provisions to UIFSA
and FFCCSOA.
UIFSA section 611 should be amended to broaden the par-
ties' ability to consent to jurisdiction to modify child support or-
ders by adding the following new subsection:
(c) If this State was the issuing state, but no longer has continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order, a tribunal
of this State may modify the order if (i) all of the individual par-
ties have filed a written consent in the issuing tribunal providing
that a tribunal of this State may modify the support order and
assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order ....
An analogous new subsection (e)(3) should be added to
FFCCSOA:
(e)(3) If a court of a State once had but no longer has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over a child-support order, a court of that
State may modify the order if (i) all of the individual parties
have filed a written consent in the appropriate court of that
State, and in the state of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (if
any), providing that the court in the first State may modify the
326 See supra notes 222-40 and accompanying text.
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support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
the order....
C. The Problem of a "Gap" in Jurisdiction
As discussed in Case 6(c), a "gap" in modification jurisdiction
arises under both UIFSA and FFCCSOA when all parties leave
the issuing state but no other state has modified the child sup-
port order.27 It is unclear whether the issuing state has the
authority to modify its own order at a party's request, even if no
other state has yet modified the order. UIFSA section 611 and
FFCCSOA subsection (e) could be amended to clarify that the is-
suing state still has jurisdiction to modify its own order in that
situation. The following subsection should be added to the pro-
posed amendment to UIFSA section 611(c):
(c) If this State was the issuing state, but no longer has continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order, a tribunal
of this State may modify the order if... (2) no tribunal of another
state has modified the child support order pursuant to a law
substantially similar to this [Act], thereby assuming continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Section 205(d).
An analogous provision should be added to FFCCSOA as
subsection (e)(3):
(e)(3) If a court of a State once had but no longer has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over a child-support order, a court of that
State may modify the order if.... (ii) no tribunal of another state
has modified the child-support order pursuant to subsections (e)
and (i), thereby assuming continuing, exclusive jurisdiction pur-
suant to subsection Cd).
D. Consistency in Choice-of-Law Provisions
As discussed in Case 6(e), the choice-of-law rules in UIFSA
and FFCCSOA are not entirely congruent.32 While FFCCSOA
provides that the forum state's law should be applied except in
certain limited circumstances, because of drafting ambiguities
UIFSA does not offer the same certainty. UIFSA section 604
should be amended to track FFCCSOA section (h).329 The pro-
posed amendment ensures that the law of the forum state would
127 See supra notes 222-40 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 246-71 and accompanying text.
32 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B(h) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-333).
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be applied in all circumstances, except where: (i) a provision of a
support order, such as the term "majority," requires interpreta-
tion; or (ii) in an action to enforce arrears under a support order,
the statute of limitations of the forum state is shorter than that
of the issuing state.3 ° These proffered changes clarify ambigui-
ties and ensure that the drafters' intent is satisfied.331
E. Lack of Nonresident-Petitioner Requirement in FFCCSOA for
Modification Jurisdiction
As discussed in Case 6(f), FFCCSOA, unlike UIFSA, does
not expressly require that the petitioner requesting a modifica-
tion of a child support order be a nonresident of the forum
state.32 The difference in statutory language could lead to in-
consistent results under the two statutes. To correct this, the
phrase "and the party seeking modification is a nonresident of the
State in which he or she seeks modification" should be appended
to FFCCSOA subsection (e)(2) to conform with the analogous
provision in section 611 of UIFSA.
F. Applicability of FFCCSOA to a State That Has Adopted
UIFSA
Finally, Congress should eliminate the potential for confu-
sion wrought by the simultaneous existence of differently worded
federal and state statutes designed to accomplish identical re-
sults. The legislative history of FFCCSOA fails to reveal a rea-
son for requiring a UIFSA state to adhere to FFCCSOA. There-
fore, a new subsection (j) should be added to FFCCSOA to
provide that FFCCSOA is not applicable in a state that has
adopted UIFSA without material alteration. 3 The proposed
subsection would read: "U]) This section does not apply in a State
that has in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as
approved by the American Bar Association on February 9, 1993."
In addition, FFCCSOA should be repealed when all states have
met the federally-mandated goal of passage of UIFSA by Janu-
ary 1, 1998.
o See id.; infra Appendix.
"' See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
32 See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
33 See infra Appendix (proposing language making FFCCSOA inapplicable in
UIFSA state).
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CONCLUSION
The "one-order-at-a-time" concept underlying UIFSA and
FFCCSOA should assist in bringing a semblance of rationality
and predictability to the troubled area of interstate support en-
forcement. As to be expected with new statutes, UIFSA and
FFCCSOA contain drafting glitches. This Article attempts to
highlight and correct those errors. Finally, FFCCSOA is super-
fluous and unnecessarily complicating in a UIFSA state and will
be entirely unnecessary when all states adopt UIFSA as a condi-
tion of federal funding.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO UIFSA37
SECTION 204:
§ 204. Simultaneous Proceedings In Another State
(a) A tribunal of this State may exercise jurisdiction to es-
tablish a support order if the [petition] or comparable pleading is
filed after a [petition] or comparable pleading is filed in another
state only if:
(1) the [petition] or comparable pleading in this State is
filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the other
state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise
of jurisdiction by the other state;
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of
jurisdiction in the other state; and
(3) [if relevant, this State is the home state of the child]
this state is the home state of a child for whom a child sup-
port order is sought to be established.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a tribunal of this State
may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the
[petition] or comparable pleading is filed in this State after a
[petition] or comparable pleading is filed in another state, if (1)
the conditions of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are met; and (2) the
[petition] or comparable pleading raises issues of both child sup-
port and child custody, and the tribunal of this State determines
that it properly may take jurisdiction of the child custody issues
pursuant to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act36 and the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.36
[(b)] (c) A tribunal of this State may not exercise jurisdiction
to establish a support order if the [petition] or comparable
pleading is filed before a [petition] or comparable pleading is
filed in another state if:
(1) the [petition] or comparable pleading in the other
state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in this
3m The deletions from existing statutes proposed by this Article are encased in
brackets and underlined, while proposed additions are in italics.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
3" The forum state's statutory citation to the UCCJA may be added here.
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State for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by this State;
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of
jurisdiction in this State; and
(3) [if relevant, the other state is the home state of the
child] the other state is the home state of a child for whom a
child support order is sought to be established.
(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c), a tribunal of this State
may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the
[petition] or comparable pleading is filed in this State before a
[petition] or comparable pleading is filed in another state, if (1)
the conditions of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) are met; and (2) the
[petition] or comparable pleading raises issues of both child sup-
port and child custody, and the tribunal of the other state deter-
mines that it properly may take jurisdiction of the child custody
issues pursuant to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act337 and
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.338
SECTIONS 205(b) AND 205(c):
The phrase "child support order" should be changed to
"support order."
SECTION 205(f):
(f) A tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistent
with the law of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over a spousal support order throughout the existence of the
support obligation, unless and until all of the parties who are in-
dividuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this
State for a tribunal of another state to modify the spousal support
order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. A tribunal
of this State may not modify a spousal-support order issued by a
tribunal of another state having continuing, exclusive jurisdic-
tion over that order under the law of that state, unless and until
all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents
with the tribunal of the other state for a tribunal of this State to
modify the spousal-support order and assume continuing, exclu-
37 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
m The forum state's statutory citation to the UCCJA may be added here.
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sive jurisdiction.
SECTION 604 (The existing section is deleted and the following
substituted):
(a) In general. In a proceeding to modify or enforce a support
order, the law of this State shall apply except as provided in sub-
sections (b) and (c).
(b) Law of issuing state. In interpreting a support order, in-
cluding the duration of current payments and other obligations of
support, a tribunal of this State shall apply the law of the issuing
state.
(c) Period of limitation. In an action to enforce arrears under
a support order, a tribunal of this State shall apply the statute of
limitation of this State or the issuing state, whichever statute
provides the longer period of limitation.
SECTION 611:
§ 611. Modification Of [Child Support Order Of Another
State
(a) After a child-support order issued in another state has
been registered in this State, the responding tribunal of this
State may modify that order only if Section 613 does not apply
and after notice and hearing it finds that:
(1) the following requirements are met:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do
not reside in the issuing state;
(ii) a [petitioner] who is a nonresident of this State
seeks modification; and
(iii) the [respondent] is subject to the personal juris-
diction of the tribunal of this State; or
(2) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this State and
all of the parties who are individuals have filed written con-
sents in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this State to
modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the order. However, if the issuing state is a
foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or established
procedures substantially similar to the procedures under
this [Act], the consent otherwise required of an individual
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residing in this State is not required for the tribunal to as-
sume jurisdiction to modify the child-support order.
(b) After a spousal-support order issued in another state has
been registered in this State, the responding tribunal of this State
may modify that order only if, after notice and hearing, it finds
that all of the individual parties have filed a written consent in
the issuing tribunal providing that a tribunal of this State may
modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive juris-
diction over the order.
(c) If this State was the issuing state, but no longer has con-
tinuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order, a tribu-
nal of this State may modify the order if (1) all of the individual
parties have filed a written consent in the issuing tribunal pro-
viding that a tribunal of this State may modify the support order
and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order, or
(2) no tribunal of another state has modified the child support
order pursuant to a law substantially similar to this [Act],
thereby assuming continuing, exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 205(d).
[r()](d) Modification of a registered [child] support order is
subject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that
apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this
State and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same
manner.
[L()](e) A tribunal of this State may not modify any aspect of
a support order that may not be modified under the law of the is-
suing state. If two or more tribunals have issued child-support
orders for the same obligor and child, the order that controls and
must be recognized under Section 207 establishes the aspects of
the support order which are nonmodifiable.
[(A](f) On issuance of an order modifying a support order is-
sued in another state, a tribunal of this State becomes the tribu-
nal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FFCCSOA
SUBSECTION (e):
(e) Authority to modify orders. A court of a State may mod-
ify a child support order issued by a court of another State if-
(1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child support
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order pursuant to subsection (i); and
(2)(A) the court of the other State no longer has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order because that
State no longer is the child's State or the residence of any indi-
vidual contestant, and the party seeking modification is a non-
resident of the State in which he or she seeks modification; or ....
(3) If a court of a State once had but no longer has continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order, a court of
that State may modify the order if (i) all of the individual parties
have filed a written consent in the appropriate court of that State,
and in the state of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (if any), pro-
viding that the court in the first State may modify the support or-
der and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order,
or (ii) no tribunal of another state has modified the child support
order pursuant to subsections (e) and (i), thereby assuming con-
tinuing, exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d).
NEW SUBSECTION (j):
() This section does not apply in a state that has in effect the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved by the
American Bar Association on February 9, 1993.
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